17 March 1983, particularly because of the return of the deceased's wife from the United States to give evidence; moreover, it is uncontested that Mr. Wright's counsel was instructed only on the very morning the trial was scheduled to start and, accordingly, had less than one day to prepare Mr. Wright's defence and the cross-examination of witnesses. However, it is equally uncontested that no adjournment of the trial was requested by either of Mr. Wright's counsel. The Committee therefore does not consider that the inadequate preparation of the defence may be attributed to the judicial authorities of the State party; if counsel had felt that they were not properly prepared, it was incumbent upon them to request the adjournment of the trial. Accordingly, the Committee finds no violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b). 8.5 With respect to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (e), it is uncontested that the trial judge refused a request from counsel to call a witness on Mr. Wright's behalf. It is not apparent, however, that the testimony sought from this witness would have buttressed the defence in respect of the charge of murder, as it merely concerned the nature of the injuries allegedly inflicted on the author by a mob outside the Waterford police station. In the circumstances, the Committee finds no violation of this provision. 8.6 Finally, the Committee has considered the author's allegation that he was ill-treated by the police. While this claim has only been contested by the State party in so far as its admissibility is concerned, the Committee is of the view that the author has not corroborated his claim, by either documentary or medical evidence. Indeed, the matter appears to have been raised in the court of first instance, which was unable to make a finding, and brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances and in the absence of further information, the Committee is unable to find that article 10 has been violated. 8.7 The Committee is of the opinion that the imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of the Covenant have not been respected constitutes, if no further appeal against the sentence is possible, a violation of article 6 of the Covenant. As the Committee noted in its General Comment 6(16), the provision that a sentence of death may be imposed only in accordance with the law and not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant implies that "the procedural guarantees therein prescribed must be observed, including the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence/ the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review of conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal, c/ In the present case, since the final sentence of death was passed without having met the requirements for a fair trial set out in article 14, it must be concluded that the right protected by article 6 of the Covenant has been violated. 9. The Human Eights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts before the Committee disclose a violation of article 14/ paragraph 1, and consequently of article 6 of the Covenant. 10. In capital punishment cases, the obligation of States parties to observe rigorously all the guarantees for a fair trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant admits of no exception. The Committee is of the view that -308-