extent the Covenant was applicable in the legislation of the Flemish, French and German communities; and what difficulties had affected the implementation of the institutional reforms. 398. Members also wished to know whether the Belgian Government, when drawing up new legal provisions, considered itself bound by the Covenant or by the European Convention on Human Sights; whether the Court of Arbitration was competent to apply the Covenant directly; whether it might be more appropriate for the administrative and other executive authorities to decide on the direct applicability of a provision of an international treaty, particularly where its interpretation was not controversial; what criteria were used in establishing international treaties in the hierarchy of internal law; whether an action invoking a provision of the Covenant could be brought before an ordinary court; how the distinction drawn by the Belgian Constitution between civil and political rights was determined in practice; how the rights of linguistic minorities were protected; and how their "linguistic option" in administrative dealings was exercised; whether there was a specific reason for the Belgian Constitution to stipulate that all powers stemmed "from the nation" rather than "from the people"; why Belgium had expressed reservations to articles of the Covenant that were almost identical to the equivalent provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights; and whether the State party intended to accede to the Optional Protocol. 399. In his response to the questions raised by members of the Committee, the representative of the State party said that, in addition to article 9 (2) of the Covenant, articles 9 (3), 14 (1) and (2) and 17 had been declared by the Court of Cassation to be directly applicable. Provisions of the Covenant that were not directly applicable did not confer any right on individuals unless their principles were reflected in domestic legislation. Provisions of the Covenant that were directly applicable took precedence not only over national legislation but also over the enactments of the communes and regions. There were four major difficulties impeding the application of the Covenant, namely, the centrifugal nature of Belgian federalism; the country's bipolar structure; different interpretations of the language law in the north and south; and the need to strike a balance, when allocating resources, between the requirements of national solidarity and those of regional and communal autonomy. 400. The representative further explained that there was basically no difference between the status of the Covenant and that of the European Convention on Human Rights in Belgium's legal system, except in the system for monitoring compliance with those instruments. Monitoring compliance with the Covenant, done through the Committee, was of a political nature, while control of the European Convention was carried out through the European Commission of Human Rights. The stringent procedures of the European Court of Human Eights, which had the power to require Belgium to change any provision of its legislation that was inconsistent with the Convention, had led Belgium to give particular attention to the Convention, 401. The Belgian legislature acknowledged its obligation under article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant to adapt internal legislation to the requirements of international law. Where that had not been done, an international provision could have direct effects in domestic law when it was clear and comprehensive, when it required Belgium either to refrain from an action or to act in a specific manner, and when it could be invoked as a source of law by -95-