8 20. In its application of February 2, 2005 in the instant case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights aptly reminded us the jurisprudence constante of this Court in the sense that the procedural system if a means to achieve justice, and justice cannot be sacrificed to propitiate mere formalities, as long as legal certainty and the procedural equality among the parties is not affected (para. 29). In a situation such as the one in the instant case, to burden the ostensibly weaker party, wanting the means for surviving with a minimum of dignity, a higher evidence standard, would amount to, in my opinion, incurring in the unfortunate mistake of requiring a probatio diabolica. 21. The latter was so labeled in Roman law, percisely in the area concerning the evidence of possession (to obtain title), and owed its name of probatio diabolica to the high degree of difficulty with which the litigating party had to cope.30 Such undue burden of proof standard was invoked in the Middle Ages, and has even been objected in contemporary litigation among states.31 As I see it, probatio diabolica is entirely inadmissible in the area of International Human Rights Law. 22. The majority of this Court, therefore, has committed a great mistake in its previous Judgment in the case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay (of June 17, 2005), in its operative paragraph No. 4, not only as to the substantive applicable law (regarding the wide scope of the fundamental right to life, and the right to cultural identity, supra), buy also as far as procedure is concerned. However, it has rectified such mistake in the Judgment the Court has just handed down in the instant case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, thus taking up again the line of its wisest precedents on the point. 23. In cases of continuing human rights breaches, and specifically, of the right to life, such as in those in the cas d'espèce, additional evidence is not needed, the cause-effect link being established (cf. infra). State obligations are of diligence and of result, not just of conduct (such as adopting insufficient and unsatisfactory legislation). In fact, the distinction between obligations of conduct and of result32 has tended to be examined from a purely theoretical standpoint, asuming variations in the conduct of the State, which can even include a succession of acts by the latter33, —and without giving enough and due consideration a situation in which an irreparable harm to the human person suddenly occurs (i.e., the deprivation of the right to life for want of due diligence by the State). V. The Question of the Causal Connection: The Lack of Due Diligence by Public Authorities. 30 . H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, Cambridge, University Press, 1967, page 156. 31 . As in the example set in the preliminary objections made by France in the case brought against it and other States by Yugoslavia, concerning the NATO bombings in 1999; International Court of Justice, preliminary objections of France of July 5, 2000, pages 4 and 16, paras. 25 and 33. 32 . Mainly in the light of the work by the International Law Commission on the International Responsibility of States. 33 . Cf. A. Marchesi, Obblighi di Condotta e Obblighi di Risultato - Contributo allo Studio degli Obblighi Internazionali, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003, pages 50-55 and 128-135.