A/76/380 integral part of thought processes, by making a mind more inclined to think one thing over another. 19 Meanwhile, some scholars contend that “thought” includes an individual’s mental capacity to “reason”, while others emphasize that thoughts also arise from spontaneous, associative and creative thinking. 20 13. Some experts ostensibly have distinguished between conscious and unconscious thought. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman, for example, proposes two modes of thinking: “fast” (automatic, intuitive and largely unconscious) and “slow” (deliberate, analytical and consciously effortful), arguably distinguishing between non -agentic (non-controlled) and agentic (self-controlled) thought. 21 Memory – ostensibly “consolidated” thoughts – could also entail either conscious or unconscious recollection. 22 Others contend that conscious thought is not entirely agentic: it often cannot be inhibited, suspended or terminated while unfolding. 23 Therefore, some experts submit that “freedom” of thought is not about “free” control over one’s own thoughts, but rather ensuring autonomy to develop thoughts, free from impermissible influences. 24 14. Many Humanists define “thought” as simultaneously a private mental experience (whether as a product or process) and a skill that can and should be cultivated through creating an enabling environment. 25 Like many skills, they argue, critical thinking skills must be “taught and given the freedom and opportunity to develop”, including through educational curricula. 26 15. Linguists often debate whether language shapes thoughts or is merely a vehicle for expressing one’s thoughts. Relativists generally believe that thoughts emerge from one’s internal dialogue, using the same grammar as one’s native language. 27 On the other hand, universalists contend that languages share the same underlying structure, possessing superficial differences that do not affect cognitive pr ocesses. 28 From this perspective, language is separate from and irrelevant to human thought. 29 16. Increasingly, stakeholders submit that “thought” is not simply limited to what is inside one’s mind, but encompasses so-called “extended cognition” or “external thinking”. 30 They theorize that certain objects (e.g., diaries, notebooks) or aspects of one’s “digital footprint” (e.g., Internet search histories, smartphone contents) may constitute “thought”, rather than being solely expressions of one’s thoughts. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression suggests that certain aspects of an individual’s digital footprint, including online searches and viewing content, constitute expressions of private “thought”. 31 Supporting “extended thought” theories, studies indicate that some people, including persons experiencing dementia, use social media __________________ 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 6/28 See https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691000671/a -spinoza-reader. See, e.g., https://www.christofflab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Doshi2012.pdf, p. 1. See https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374533557. Submission from Antoon De Baets. See https://www.blogs.uni-mainz.de/fb05philosophie/files/2013/04/Metzinger_MAutonomy_JCS_2015.pdf, p. 270. See https://www.worldcat.org/title/un-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights-ccprcommentary/oclc/1037676229?referer=di&ht=edition, p. 412. Submission from Humanists UK. Consultation with Humanists International. See https://www.worldcat.org/title/explorations-in-linguistic-relativity/oclc/746930056, pp. 25–44. See https://www.worldcat.org/title/rethinking-linguistic-relativity/oclc/33047146. See https://monoskop.org/images/2/20/Pinker_Steven_The_language_instinct_1995.Pdf , p. 60. See https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2019.00019/full ; submissions from Jubilee Campaign, Susie Alegre, Jan Christoph Bublitz, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; see also https://www.ida.liu.se/~729A10/mtrl/Rowlands.pdf. A/HRC/47/25, para. 66. 21-14191