26 "RELATING TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE LAWS ON THE USE OF LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION IN BELGIUM" v. BELGIUM (MERITS) JUDGMENT from interfering" into duties "to provide something": it means that when a State "without being under any obligation to do so", takes positive action with regard to the rights laid down in the Convention, it must do so without discrimination. In the sphere of education, "the obligation not to discriminate" is neither "positive" nor "negative" but "conditional": "If the State assumes", quite freely, "functions" in this sphere, it "must carry them out in a non-discriminatory manner". The Commission, referring to "contemporary theory" and to its own decisions is of the opinion that the Convention does not prohibit the establishment of legitimate "differentiation" in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed: an "extensive interpretation" based on the French text of Article 14 (art. 14) ("sans distinction aucune"), "would lead to absurd results". Article 14 (art. 14) condemns only "discrimination", and the Commission makes a point of stating precisely how it understands this word. In its opinion a State does not discriminate if it limits itself to conferring an "advantage", a "privilege" or a "favour" on a particular group or individual which it denies to others. The question of a possible discrimination arises only if the difference in treatment in issue amounts to a "hardship" inflicted on certain people. Further it is necessary that the so termed "hardship" should not be justified by "considerations based on the general interest" and, in particular, by "administrative or financial" needs. The "motives" and the "philosophy" which have inspired the Government are to be taken into account in this context but it is likewise necessary to see whether such motives and philosophy as are regarded as "legitimate" have inspired measures which are incompatible with the rights and freedoms safeguarded including "the right to non-discrimination". "The appraisal" of the "public interest" is not "exempt from review by the organs" established "for the implementation of the Convention". "Several Articles" of the Convention, for example, Articles 8-11 (art. 8, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11), and Article 15 (art. 15) "are worded in such a way as to require what might be called political judgments"; however, "the Commission has constantly taken the view, with which the Court agreed in the Lawless case", that the organs set up to ensure respect for the Convention are empowered to make "such judgments"; if this were not so, "the international protection of human rights" would lose "its effectiveness" and "its very meaning". The position is the same with respect to Article 14 (art. 14): if it is accepted "that certain differentiations may be justified on reasonable and legitimate grounds", the idea of "international review" requires that the Commission and the Court "attempt to verify the motives of the legislative body as well as the aims and effects of the legislation". To examine whether those motives are "reasonable", those aims "legitimate" and those effects "justifiable", in no way amounts to placing under "tutelage" the Contracting States, to which the Commission in any case reserves a "certain margin of discretion".