the passage requiring a declaration as regards the "mothertongue" of the child. This action may nioreover be explained by the fact that the text itself of the articles in question does not require a declaration on this point and that the Convention does not employ the phrase langue maternelle (mother-tongue). Nor does the Court attach much importance to the argument which the German Government drew from the attitude adopted by the Polish Government during the negotiations which took place between Poland and the Free City of D?nzig and which led to the Agreement of October 24th, 1921, concluded less than one month before the commencement of the negotiations with Germany relating to Upper Silesia. According to the German Government, the Polish Government had then demanded the adoption of the principle which the German Government now maintains. The Court does not find this to be quite correct. Poland then advocated two things : (1) that the admission to the minority schools a t Danzig should not depend upon the condition that the child should be both racially and linguistically Polish, but that it should be sufficient for it to be either Polish by origin or Polish by language ; (2) that the declaration of the person responsible for. the education of the child should be decisive as to whether the child was of Polish tongue or of Polish origin, any verification of the truth of this declaration by the school authorities being prohibited. Poland thus claimed two different bases each of which was to suffice for admission to minority schools, namely, either the Polish origin or the Polish tongue of the child. The second basis alone would seem to have been adopted in the Geneva Convention. The request of Poland in this respect appears to correspond perfectly with the substance of the first paragraph of Article 131 of the Geneva Convention and therefore cannot provide an argument in favour of the construction of this article proposed by Germany . But although the conclusion drawn by the Court from the terms of the Convention is that Article 131 contemplates a declaration which on principle must refer to the existence of a fact and not express an intention or a wish, that does not exclude the possibility, when appreciating those facts, of properly taking into account a subjective element. Indeed,