on the prohibition of direct discrimination is rather straightforward and assessed below through the examination of examples from their jurisprudence. In General Comment No. 18 on non-discrimination, the UN HRC maintained that the term ‘discrimination’ under Article 26 ICCPR implies: ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.’ 13 The HRC further noted that: ‘not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant’.14 Furthermore, in its General Comment No. 23 on the rights of minorities, the HRC affirmed that the prohibition of discrimination in Articles 2 and 26 ICCPR applies to minorities as well.15 Regrettably, there are very few communications before the HRC where these provisions have been used in relation to minorities.16 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)17 famously ruled in the Belgian Linguistics case that ‘the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and reasonable justification’.18 Importantly, such differential treatment must pursue a legitimate aim; moreover, the means employed to achieve this aim must be proportionate.19 In its earlier jurisprudence the ECtHR was reluctant to use Article 14 on a number of occasions. For example, in Podkolzina v Latvia, concerning additional linguistic requirements imposed on candidates for elections in Latvia, the ECtHR refused to consider the applicant’s claims of differential treatment as a member of Russian-speaking minority under Article 14 ECHR.20 Likewise, in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France,21 an Orthodox Jewish liturgical association did not succeed in persuading the ECtHR that the refusal of authorities to allow them ritual slaughter in line with their convictions violated Article 9 together with Article 14 ECHR. However, recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR has marked significant developments and saw more confident application of aspects of Article 14 in a range of cases discussed below, including, for example, Thlimmenos v Greece,22 Aziz v Cyprus,23 Nachova v Bulgaria,24 Timishev v Russia,25 D.H. and Others v The Czech Republic,26 and Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina.27 This is the case even when the decision does not favour the group. 6 For instance, in Nachova v Bulgaria, despite the Grand Chamber’s reversal of the 2004 Chamber decision finding a violation of Article 14 read together with Article 2 ECHR in its substantive aspect, the Grand Chamber found a violation of these provisions in their procedural aspect, accepting in principle that in certain cases the burden of proof can be shifted onto the authorities. The Grand Chamber subsequently picked up on this reasoning in D.H. and Others v The Czech Republic (discussed below). This is not to suggest that the ECtHR now easily agrees to consider Article 14 issues. A degree of reluctance is likely to remain. However, compared to the earlier jurisprudence of the ECtHR, Article 14 case law is currently more progressive. It is hoped that this approach will be further strengthened with the wider application of Protocol 12 ECHR. There are fewer cases which came before the quasijudicial bodies in the Inter-American and African contexts. Overall, the Inter-American Court’s (IACtHR) method of finding direct discrimination is similar to that of the ECtHR. For example, in its advisory opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,28 the IACtHR stated that differential treatment would not constitute discrimination when ‘the classifications selected are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under review’.29 Furthermore, the aims must not be ‘unjust or unreasonable’.30 Conversely, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) assessment of discrimination is somewhat sketchy: it identifies those who have been subjected to differential treatment based on ethnic origin and finds a violation of Article 2 without elaborating on the matters of principle, such as in Amnesty International v Zambia31 and the Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Others v Rwanda,32 which are discussed in more detail in the sub-section on ‘Race and ethnicity’ (p. 11). Indirect discrimination Indirect discrimination occurs where rules which are neutral on the face of it, have disproportionate effects on members of a certain group without any objective and reasonable justification. Indirect discrimination did not feature strongly in the initial approach of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies, except for the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which, as early as 1974, established that ‘the rules regarding equality of treatment … forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result …’ 33 MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE