concept that relates to the collective right to survival as an organized people, with control over their habitat as a necessary condition for reproduction of their culture, for their own development and to carry out their life aspirations.’ 317 It follows, the IACtHR continued, that ‘disregarding the ancestral right of the members of the indigenous communities to their territories could affect other basic rights, such as the right to cultural identity and to the very survival of the indigenous communities and their members’.318 On the other hand, the IACtHR observed that: ‘restriction of the right of private individuals to private property might be necessary to attain the collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a democratic and pluralist society, in the sense given to this by the American Convention; and it could be proportional, if fair compensation is paid to those affected pursuant to Article 21(2) of the Convention.’ 319 These guidelines seem to have been crystallized in the IACtHR’s jurisprudence. Indeed, in the two cases of this kind thus far decided, the IACtHR always found in favour of indigenous peoples. This remains true even though it cautiously observed that deciding in favour of indigenous peoples in one particular case does not imply ‘that every time there is a conflict between the territorial interests of private individuals or of the State and those of the members of the indigenous communities, the latter must prevail over the former’.320 Land rights and natural resources The most significant issue the IACtHR has yet to adequately address concerns the rights over natural resources that are found on indigenous land. The IACtHR dealt with these issues in one case only, that is, the 2007 Saramaka People v Suriname case. In its judgment, the IACtHR established a number of clear and definitive principles, yet left a number of important questions unanswered. The same, as we shall see, can be said with regard to the IACHR. Focusing, first, on the well-established principles, the IACtHR held, unambiguously, that the indigenous peoples’ right ‘to use and enjoy their territory would be meaningless … if said right were not connected to the natural resources that lie on and within the land’.321 Consequently, the IACtHR found that Article 21 protects also those natural resources found on and within traditionally owned territory. However, the IACtHR also added that the resources to be protected are actually 32 those ‘necessary for the very survival, development and continuation of [indigenous peoples’] way of life’.322 At this point, therefore, two crucial questions need to be addressed. First, whether Article 21 also protects those natural resources that are not necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples and, second, whether it is possible to introduce restrictions to the recognized right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their natural resources. With regard to the former point, the IACtHR made it clear that the answer should be in the positive. This is so because activities related to resources that are not necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples may nevertheless have important repercussions on those resources which, by contrast, are necessary for their survival.323 In this respect, therefore, the focus must switch to the consequences of the said activities. In regard to the latter point, instead, the IACtHR noted that ‘Article 21 should not be interpreted in a way that prevents the state from granting any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of natural recourses’ within a territory owned by an indigenous community.324 It follows that restrictions to the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their natural resources may be possible. This said, following the same principles elaborated in the context of land rights proper, the IACtHR found that restrictions are possible only if they are established by law, are necessary and proportional, and have the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society.325 However, since the survival of the indigenous community is at stake, further safeguards need to be put in place, for restrictions should never amount to ‘a denial of [indigenous] traditions and customs in a way that it endangers the very survival of the group and its members’.326 More precisely, in order to safeguard the special relationship between indigenous peoples and their territories, and, thus, their very existence, the IACtHR held that states have four fundamental obligations: first, to ensure the effective participation of the members of the community in any development, or investment, plan; second, to ensure that the concerned people have a reasonable share of the benefits; third, to perform or supervise prior environmental and social impact assessments; and, fourth, to implement adequate safeguards and mechanisms so as to avoid the activities concerned significantly affecting the condition of the traditional lands and natural resources at stake.327 At this point, a number of complications emerge in the light of the IACtHR’s identification of two parallel regimes with regard to states’ first obligation, namely to ensure the effective participation of indigenous peoples. More precisely, the IACtHR observed that in case of small-scale developments states must simply consult the MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE