CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016 society”. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that the legislature did not clearly define such an objective, either in the Act itself or in the statement of purpose. The Committee recognizes it may be in a State’s interest to promote sociability and mutual respect among individuals, in all their diversity, in its territory, and thus that the concealment of the face could be perceived as a potential obstacle to such interaction. 8.10 However, the Committee observes that the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others requires identifying what specific fundamental rights are affected, and the persons so affected. Article 18 (3) exceptions are to be interpreted strictly and not applied in the abstract.22 In the present case, the Committee observes that the concept of “living together” is very vague and abstract. The State party has not identified any specific fundamental rights or freedoms of others that are affected by the fact that some people present in the public space have their face covered, including fully veiled women. Nor has the State party explained why such rights would be “unfairly” obstructed by wearing the full-face veil, but not by covering the face in public through the numerous other means that are exempted from the Act. The right to interact with any individual in public and the right not to be disturbed by other people wearing the full-face veil are not protected by the Covenant and therefore cannot provide the basis for permissible restrictions within the meaning of article 18 (3). 8.11 Even assuming that the concept of living together could be considered a “legitimate objective” in the sense of article 18 (3), the Committee observes that the State party has failed to demonstrate that the criminal ban on certain means of covering of the face in public, which constitutes a significant restriction of the rights and freedoms of the author as a Muslim woman who wears the full-face veil, is proportionate to that aim, or that it is the least restrictive means that is protective of religion or belief. 8.12 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the State party has failed to demonstrate that the limitation of the author’s freedom to manifest her religion or beliefs, through the wearing of the niqab, was necessary and proportionate within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee therefore concludes that the ban introduced by Act No. 2010-1192 and the conviction of the author under said Act for wearing the niqab violated the author’s rights under article 18 of the Covenant. 8.13 As to the author’s claims under article 26 of the Covenant, namely that the law in question had the effect of indirectly discriminating against the minority of Muslim women who wear the full-face veil, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the prohibition introduced by the Act is not based on the religious connotation of the clothes in question, but on the fact that they conceal the face. According to the State party, only “the extremely radical form of clothing, which results in the public effacement of the person” is affected, meaning that for the author “it would not be difficult to access the public space wearing a veil that would demonstrate her religious beliefs without concealing her face”. The Committee notes, however, that the French National Assembly, in its resolution on the commitment to uphold republican values in the face of the development of radical practices that undermine them, considers that “radical practices detrimental to human dignity and equality between men and women, including the wearing of a full-face veil, are contrary to the values of the Republic” and that it would like “the fight against discrimination and the promotion of equality between men and women to be priorities of public policy”. The Committee further observes that Act No. 2010-1192, despite being drafted in general terms, includes exceptions for most contexts of face-covering in public, thus limiting the applicability of the ban to little more than the full-face Islamic veil, and that the Act has been primarily enforced against women wearing the full-face veil. Hence, from the text of the Act, the debate preceding its adoption and its implementation in practice, the Committee observes that the Act is applied mainly to the full-face Islamic veil, which is a form of religious observance and identification for a minority of Muslim women. 8.14 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (para. 2), in which it viewed with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they represented religious minorities that could be the subject of 22 12 General comment No. 22, para. 8.