A/67/303 and subcommunities, and will also be open to peaceful competition and intellectual controversies on religious and belief-related questions. 55. The specific concept of peace underlying international human rights clearly differs from the authoritarian control agendas that are sometimes also put forward in the name of “peace” or “harmony”. However, a peace based on respect for the dignity and freedom of all human beings goes deeper and has a better chance of sustainability than any societal order organized around such ideas as hegemony, customs or mere authority. Respect for human dignity, in turn, is not conceivable without recognition of every human being’s freedom to communicate about issues of religion or belief, including the right to try to persuade others in a non-coercive manner. 2. Threatened erosion of moral values 56. Restrictions on freedom of religion or belief are sometimes implemented in the name of protecting moral values based on a particular religious tradition that often is the tradition of the majority in a country. From that point of view, missionary activities may be perceived by some Governments as challenging the predominance of a religious tradition with allegedly adverse consequences for the moral fabric of society as a whole. Restrictive measures imposed by States to prevent such a development may target not only those who try to convert others by means of non-coercive persuasion, but also persons who themselves have converted or wish to convert away from the dominant religion of the country. This problem frequently occurs in countries where there is a State religion. 57. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the Human Rights Committee has argued for a pluralistic understanding of the concept of “morals”, a concept listed among the possible grounds for limiting manifestations of freedom of religion or belief in article 18 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In its general comment No. 22, the Human Rights Committee clarifies that the concept of morals “derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition”. In its recent general comment No. 34 on freedoms of opinion and expression, the Committee adds that “[a]ny such limitations must be understood in the light of the universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination” (see CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 32). The Special Rapporteur welcomes this clarification, which must also be applied to any restrictions imposed on manifestations of freedom of religion or belief. 58. Restrictions on manifestations of freedom of religion or belief, including non-coercive attempts to convert others, thus cannot be justified by the invocation of a closed understanding of a moral order based on one particular religious or philosophical tradition. Instead, any restrictions deemed necessary by States must meet all the specific criteria prescribed in article 18 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, the interest of protecting certain moral or religious values may never be invoked to restrict the freedom of conversion itself which, as part of the absolutely protected forum internum dimension of freedom of religion or belief, does not permit any limitations whatsoever. For the same reason, the notion of moral values cannot be used to 18 12-46130