Appendix Individual opinion of Mr. Bertil Wennerqren pursuant to rule 94, paragraph 3, of the Committee's rules of procedure, concerning the Committee's views on communication No. 277/1988 (Marieta and Juan Fernando Teran Jijon v. Ecuador) I concur with the Committee's views, with the exception of the findings, in paragraph 5.4, on Mr. Teraa's claim that he was forced to sign 10 blank sheets of paper during the interrogation that took place when he was kept incommunicado in detention and subjected to maltreatment. The Committee has expressed the view, in paragraph 5.2, that the evidence submitted is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Mr. Teran Jijon was subjected to treatment prohibited under article 7 of the Covenant, and that he was not treated with respect for the inherent dignity of his person (in violation of art. 10, para. 1 ) . However, the Committee found that the element of signing 10 blank sheets of paper did not raise an issue under article 14, paragraph 3 (g). In that respect/ I disagree. I first note that the State party has not addressed Mr. Teran 1 s allegation that he was forced to sign these blank sheets. In the circumstances/ there is sufficient reason to believe that the allegation is based on verifiable events. I therefore believe that the Committee's findings should have been made on the basis of these facts as found. Pursuant to article 14, paragraph 3 (g), everyone shall, in the determination of any criminal charge against him, be entitled not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. This means that during criminal proceedings, neither the prosecutor nor the judge nor anyone else may threaten the accused or otherwise try to exert pressure on him, so as to force him to testify against himself or to confess guilt. It also would violate the principle of objectivity and impartiality if such incidents were to occur; it would further entail a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 <g), if testimony or a confession obtained through compulsion in pretrial interrogation were to be introduced as evidence. Article 15 of the Convention against Torture confirms this view by prescribing that each State party shall ensure that any statement which is found to have been made as a result of torture shall not be introduced as evidence in any judicial proceedings, except against an individual accused of torture, as evidence that the statement -was made. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid that an incrimination or confession, in spite of their not being given any weight as evidence, cast a shadow on the accused. All attempts to compel a person to incriminate him or herself or to confess guilt should thus be prevented. It is not unusual that, as a method of compulsion, an interrogator forces the accused to sign blank papers, insinuating that incrxminations or confessions of crimes more serious than the ones he is accused of, would be added. In so doing, the interrogator of course violates articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, but, in my opinion, he also violates article 14, paragraph 3 (g). That conclusion follows my conviction that no form of compulsion to make an individual incriminate him or herself or to confess guilt, can be accepted; this is so regardless of whether it is an express incrimination or merely a hypothetical one. There is always the risk -266-