CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 The concealment of the face prevents the identification of a person and is liable to impair the interaction between individuals and undermine the conditions for living together in a diverse society. 5.8 Public safety and public order require that everyone can be identified if need be, in order to prevent attacks on the security of persons and property and to combat identity fraud. This implies that people must show their faces, which is vital in the context of the international terrorist threat.15 5.9 The State party rejects the characterization of the Act as prohibiting Muslim women from manifesting their religious beliefs by wearing the veil and specifies that it only prohibits total concealment of the face, regardless of the reason, and allows any person in a public space to wear clothing intended to express a religious belief, such as a headscarf or turban, provided that it reveals the face. The problem here is quite different from that related to the wearing of religious symbols by public officials in the context of public service, or wearing them at school, where the neutrality of the public service is at stake. In the case in point, the ban is not based on the religious connotations of the articles of clothing concerned but solely on the fact that they conceal the full face. Only “the most radical form of clothing that makes the person invisible in public is affected”. The author can easily access public space wearing a headscarf, which would manifest her religious beliefs without concealing her face. In addition, the Constitutional Council has stated that the ban could not restrict the exercise of religious freedom in places of worship open to the public. Therefore, the measure is proportionate to its purpose and the State party has not exceeded its margin of appreciation in the present case, as confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in the above-cited case of S.A.S. v. France. Moreover, the Court of Cassation ruled in a judgment of 5 March 2013 that the Act was in accordance with article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (on freedom of thought, conscience and religion). Lastly, the sanctions provided for by the Act – at most, the fine for category two offences (€150) – are modest and proportionate to the objectives pursued. With regard to the alternative sanction, a citizenship course, this is a classic penalty under French criminal law that is applicable to many offences. It serves to remind offenders about the republican values of tolerance and respect for human dignity and to make them aware of their criminal and civil responsibilities and their duties as members of society. 5.10 In a circular dated 31 March 2011 addressed to prefects, the Prime Minister clarified the procedure to be followed by the police and gendarmerie when dealing with an offender, and pointed out that the Act in no way authorized officers to compel persons to uncover themselves. One cannot therefore speak of a disproportionate restriction of a person’s freedom of religion. 5.11 With regard to the author’s claim of a violation of articles 12 and 26 of the Covenant, the author has failed to establish that the ban put in place by the Act targets only women who wear the full-face veil or that persons concealing their faces by some other means would not be apprehended. On the contrary, the Act provides for a general ban, does not target any specific article of clothing and makes no distinction between men and women. Moreover, the ban provided for by the Act cannot be construed as inherently discriminatory or prejudicial to freedom of movement, since there is an objective and reasonable justification for it. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must determine, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether it is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 15 8 The State party cites the Committee’s Views in the case of Ranjit Singh v. France, para. 8.4, in which the Committee recognized the State party’s need to ensure and verify, for the purposes of public safety and order, that the person appearing in the photograph on a residence permit was in fact the rightful holder of that document.