CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 are predicated. Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.26 7.5 In the present case, the Committee notes that it is not disputed that the ban on wearing the niqab falls clearly within the scope of the Act, as set out in article 1 thereof. It is therefore incumbent upon the Committee to assess whether this restriction, which is provided for by law, pursues a legitimate objective, is necessary to achieve that objective and is proportionate and non-discriminatory. 7.6 The Committee notes that the State party has put forward two objectives that are purportedly pursued by the Act, namely, the protection of public safety and public order and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 7.7 With respect to protection of public safety and order, the State party contends that it must be possible to identify all individuals when necessary, in order to prevent threats to the security of persons and property and to combat identity fraud. The Committee recognizes the need for the State party, in certain circumstances, to require individuals to reveal their face, which could entail on occasion uncovering their face in the specific circumstances of a risk to public safety or order or for identification purposes. 27 The Committee observes, however, that the Act is not limited to such contexts, but comprehensively prohibits the wearing of certain face coverings in public at all times, and that the State party has not demonstrated how wearing the full-face veil in itself poses a threat to public safety or public order that would justify such an absolute ban. Nor has the State party provided any public safety justification or explanation for why covering the face for certain religious purposes – namely, the niqab – is prohibited, while covering the face for numerous other purposes, including sporting, artistic and other traditional and religious purposes is allowed. The Committee further observes that the State party has not described any specific context, or given any example, in which there was a real and significant threat to public safety or public order that would justify such a blanket ban on the full-face veil. Nor does the existence of such a threat appear to be mentioned in the preamble to the Act or in the National Assembly resolution of 11 May 2010, which preceded the adoption of the law. 7.8 Even if the State party could demonstrate the existence of a real and meaningful threat to public safety and public order in principle, it has not demonstrated that the ban set out in the Act is proportionate to that objective, in particular in view of the numerous exceptions to the Act and its considerable impact on the author as a Muslim woman wearing the full-face veil. Nor has it attempted to demonstrate that the ban was the least restrictive measure necessary to ensure protection of freedom of religion or belief.28 7.9 With regard to the second objective presented by the State party, understood as the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others under article 18 (3), the Committee notes the State party’s argument based on the concept of “living together”, or observance of the minimum requirements of life in society. According to the State party, showing one’s face indicates agreement to be identified by one’s interlocutor and not to “unfairly” conceal one’s state of mind, this being the “minimum level of trust required to live together in an open and egalitarian society”. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that the legislature did not clearly define such an objective, either in the Act itself or in a statement of purpose. The Committee recognizes that a State may have an interest in promoting sociability and mutual respect among individuals in its territory and, in this context, social interaction among individuals in all their diversity and thus that concealment of the face could be seen as a potential obstacle to such interaction. 7.10 However, the Committee observes that the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others requires identifying what specific fundamental rights are affected and the persons so affected. The exceptions in article 18 (3) are to be interpreted strictly and not applied in the abstract.29 In this case, the Committee observes that the concept of “living together” is a very vague and abstract term. The State party has not identified any specific 26 27 28 29 Ibid. See the judgment to this effect in S.A.S. v. France, para. 139. E/CN.4/2006/5, para. 58. General comment No. 22 (1993), para. 8. 11