CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 6.2 The Committee observes that the author lodged an application concerning the same events with the European Court of Human Rights. She was informed by letter of 11 September 2014 that a single judge had declared the application inadmissible on the grounds that the conditions of admissibility laid down in articles 34–35 of the European Convention on Human Rights had not been met. The Committee recalls that, on ratifying the Optional Protocol, France entered a reservation excluding the competence of the Committee to consider cases that were being or had been examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence regarding article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol16 to the effect that, when the European Court of Human Rights bases a decision of inadmissibility not solely on procedural grounds but also on reasons that include a certain consideration of the merits of a case, then the same matter should be deemed to have been examined within the meaning of the respective reservations to article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol.17 It is therefore for the Committee to determine whether, in the case in question, the Court went beyond an examination of the purely formal criteria of admissibility when it declared the application inadmissible on the grounds that the conditions of admissibility laid down in articles 34–35 of the European Convention on Human Rights had not been met. 6.4 The Committee gathers from the letter from the European Court of Human Rights invoking articles 34–35, that the author’s application did not appear to have been declared inadmissible on purely procedural grounds. However, the Committee notes that, from the succinct nature of the reasoning given by the Court, no argument or clarification regarding the decision of inadmissibility was apparently provided to the author to justify a rejection of the application based on the merits. 18 In the light of these specific circumstances, the Committee considers that it is not in a position to determine with certainty that the case presented by the author has already been the subject of an examination, however limited, on the merits.19 For these reasons, the Committee considers that the reservation made by France regarding article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol does not in itself constitute an obstacle to a consideration of the merits by the Committee.20 6.5 With regard to the requirement for the exhaustion of domestic remedies established by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the State party notes that the complaint concerning a rights violation currently before the Committee was first raised by the author in her application for review to the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation, which found her argument inadmissible on the grounds that it should have been raised before the lower court. The State party refers to the Bikramjit Singh case to show that domestic remedies have not been exhausted.21 The author contests this assertion, pointing out that the Bikramjit Singh case is not comparable to her situation because her only opportunity to voice her complaints before appealing to the Court of Cassation was to raise them with the community court. In this regard, the author stresses that community court proceedings are expedited extremely quickly, are presided over by a single judge who is generally not a judge by profession and are not subject to appeal, and that she was not represented by counsel. The author further contends that her complaints were properly brought before the Court of Cassation because, like an a posteriori review of constitutionality, they raised “purely legal” arguments under article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6.6 The Committee observes that the State party has not rebutted these allegations, and specifically those concerning the proceedings before the community court and their availability and effectiveness in the author’s case. The Committee further notes that the community court is a public space in which, under the Act, to wear the niqab would constitute a criminal offence and that the author did not attend the hearing. The Committee also notes 16 17 18 19 20 21 See, for example, Rivera Fernández v. Spain (CCPR/C/85/D/1396/2005), para. 6.2. See, inter alia, the cases of Mahabir v. Austria (CCPR/C/82/D/944/2000), para. 8.3; Linderholm v. Croatia (CCPR/C/66/D/744/1997), para. 4.2; and A.M. v. Denmark, communication No. 121/1982, para. 6. X v. Norway (CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014), para. 6.2. Mahabir v. Austria, para. 8.3. See also A.G.S. v. Spain (CCPR/C/115/D/2626/2015), para. 4.2. Bikramjit Singh v. France, para. 7.4. 9