CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016 that the Bikramjit Singh case did not involve criminal proceedings, in which the right of appeal must be guaranteed, and that the author in that case had the opportunity to submit his complaints to two lower courts before trying to submit new ones to the Court of Cassation. On the other hand, in the present case, the author was unable to have her complaints reconsidered on appeal before a court other than the Court of Cassation. 22 In the light of all the information before the Committee, and in the absence of further explanation from the State party, the Committee concludes that reasonably accessible domestic remedies have been exhausted. 6.7 The Committee considers that the author’s complaints, which raise issues under articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant, are sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, declares them admissible and proceeds to consider them on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claims that the criminal prohibition on concealing the face in public spaces introduced by the Act and her conviction for wearing the niqab violate her rights under article 18 of the Covenant. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the Act imposes a general ban on any article of clothing intended to conceal the face in public spaces, regardless of the form it takes or the reason for wearing it, and that the Act does not specially treat religious clothing. The Committee notes, however, that article 2 (2) broadly exempts from the Act clothing worn for health or professional reasons, or that is part of sporting, artistic or traditional festivities or events, or clothing that otherwise is legally authorized. The Committee further notes the author’s submission, not contested by the State party, that fewer than 2,000 women wear the full-face veil in France, and that the vast majority of checks under the Act have been performed on women wearing the full-face veil.23 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (1993), in which it stated that the freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised either individually or in community with others and in public or private. The observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings.24 It is not disputed that, as the author asserts, the wearing of the full-face veil is customary for a segment of the Muslim faithful and that it is part of the observance and practice of a religion. Nor is it disputed that the Act is applicable to the niqab worn by the author, who is thereby forced to give up dressing in accordance with her religious beliefs or else face sanctions. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the ban introduced by the Act constitutes a restriction or limitation of the author’s right to manifest her religion or belief, within the meaning of article 18 (1) of the Covenant, by wearing the niqab. 7.4 The Committee must therefore determine whether such a restriction is authorized by article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that article 18 (3) permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief only if limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.25 The Committee observes, moreover, that article 18 (3) is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, for instance on grounds of national security. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they 22 23 24 25 10 In its general comment No. 32 (2007), the Committee stated that a State party had a duty to review substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the law, the conviction and sentence, such that the procedure allowed for due consideration of the nature of the case (para. 48). See para. 3.13 above and the footnote therein. General comment No. 22 (1993), para. 4. Ibid., para. 8.