“The national institution shall have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the government and not be subject to financial control which might affect this independence.” Paris Principles, Principle B(2). The ombudsman institution must follow the contracting rules that apply under domestic law to public bodies. A contract should not be awarded where a conflict of interest exists. The minority ombudsman institution will almost certainly enter into contracts of varying types, from purchasing equipment or purchasing support services, to the awarding of contracts for research relating to the work of the institution. The institution is likely to be bound by a set of contracting rules which apply generally under domestic law to public bodies, and as such, officers and staff should be thoroughly familiar with such rules, ensuring that they are adhered to. If no such rules apply to the institution, or if such rules are insufficiently developed, the institution must prepare its own rules, which it should publicize generally and provide to all prospective contractors, and it must then adhere to them. These rules should reflect the highest standards with respect to tendering and competition for contracts. In all cases, the terms of the contract competition, including the specifications and criteria to be applied, must be made clear. Generally, contracts should be given to the lowest (or where appropriate depending on the competition, the highest) bidder meeting all the criteria, unless there are compelling reasons to choose another bid. In all cases, any conflicts or potential conflicts of interest must be declared, and in no case should a contract be awarded where such a conflict exists. PART III For example, the Danish Institute for Human Rights, the Equality Commission of Northern Ireland and the German Institute for Human Rights have established a two-month staff exchange program. Similarly, the Office of the Ombudsperson in Kosovo and the Citizen’s Defender in Albania have arranged temporary staff exchanges between their offices. The ombudsman institution must enjoy financial independence. The importance of trying to guarantee that the ombudsman institution is as financially independent as possible was discussed in Part II. The financial independence of the institution is maximized by ensuring that its funding by the government is not discretionary, but is based on a non-discretionary formula, automatically adjusted for inflation, that is ideally set out in the statute or other legislative act by which the institution is created. If the funding of the institution cannot be safeguarded in this way, the institution should make use of its annual report to highlight its budgetary needs, and to raise the issue of its budget before parliament, in the course of its scrutiny of the institution’s annual report. While it is often the case that funding for institutions such as an ombudsman is insufficient, the institution should only accept external funding for specific projects or capacity-building endeavours so that the ombudsman can retain control over the funds. The independence and power of instruction over the funding should be ensured by contract. In all other cases, the existence of such financial links can create the impression that the institution is no longer unbiased, and this could compromise its effectiveness. The ombudsman institution may also develop an office policy that all sub-contractors are required to protect and promote minority rights and comply with international human rights standards, or have a diversity policy in place in their organization or business. 55