A/CONF.189/PC.1/7 page 15 50. Finally, genocide must be aimed at a group, qualified by the relevant instruments as “national, ethnical, racial or religious”. Although it is known who is excluded, none of the texts defines which groups should enjoy protection.63 Although certain authors regard each of these concepts as having a different meaning [Glaser, 1970],64 it is difficult, as we have said, to distinguish definite boundaries between them [Verhoeven, 1991].65 Here, too, the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is instructive for the purposes of our study. 51. First, the lack of precise boundaries does not seem to have caused the Tribunal any difficulty, which confirms the above-mentioned idea that international law habitually protects, in the absence of a general agreement as to the beneficiaries of protection. Next, it has to be noted that there are terminological variations in the concepts used, although some preference is shown for certain of them. For example, the concept of race appears very seldom in the Tribunal's references to the groups subject to the crime of genocide. In the Meakic case, the Tribunal refers to “Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as national, ethnical, racial [our emphasis] or religious groups”.66 However, in addition to the use of the general expression “ethnic” cleansing, the terms “groups” (Bosnian, Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim national groups)67 “communities” (Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities)68 and population (Muslim population)69 are frequently used. The Tribunal does not appear to insist on a formal dividing line between national group and other groups (essentially ethnic and religious). The groups referred to are at times described as national groups (Bosnian, Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim national groups), at times seem to be defined in terms of their religious identity (Muslim communities), and may even be defined in terms of a blend of national and religious aspects (Bosnian Muslim national group). When it refers to this last group, religion even becomes “a nationality”, confirming what has been said about the ethnicity of religion. Finally, when it speaks of “ethnic cleansing” the Tribunal is referring to all these groups together, against which genocide has been committed. This approach may stretch the ethnicity criterion to such a point that it encompasses both national and religious, even racial, aspects; unlike the human rights treaties, which seem to make a clear distinction between “national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.70 52. The goal of this study is ultimately not to show how serious the crime of genocide is, as the concept itself is amply sufficient to do so. For some writers, genocide is even “an aggravated or qualified case of crime against humanity” [Glaser, 1970].71 The goal of this analysis is found at another level. Our analysis of the constituent elements of the crime of genocide, in particular, but not exclusively, the element of intent, has enabled us to identify an ambiguity, what might even be termed a conceptual and methodological confusion which makes it possible to compare, obviously to a certain extent, genocide with aggravated discrimination, the subject of our study. In any event, between genocide - assuming it had a clear-cut definition - and single forms of discrimination, there would be a considerable number of variations of discrimination with progressive degrees of seriousness, culminating in discrimination which can certainly not be characterized as genocide, but which requires a special regime, because it concerns persons whose group identity is found at the crossroads between religion and race.