context of the development of Berlin 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall and basing them on his political work in Berlin, have the consequence that public figures enjoy special and arbitrary protection when expressing racist views. Moreover, the judiciary legitimizes such statements and not only promotes the establishment and acceptance of racism in society but also contributes to the development of racism. The facts complained of therefore reveal a violation of the Convention. On 10 February 2012, the petitioner refers to the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court cited by the position paper of GIHR (see para. 8.3), which states that if statements depict foreigners as inferior, for example, through the generalized attribution of socially unacceptable behaviour or characteristics, freedom of expression cannot prevail over human dignity. Mr. Sarrazin’s statements contain exactly this kind of generalized attribution in relation to supposedly unacceptable behaviour and characteristics, inter alia referring to “Turks” and “Arabs” who have characteristics attributed to them solely on the basis of their origin. Further observations by the State party 10.1On 9 February 2012, the State party, in response to the amicus curiae brief submitted by the German Institute of Human Rights (GIHR), notes that the point at issue is not whether the State party’s judiciary shares or supports Mr. Sarrazin’s statements. The State party reiterates that it rejects these opinions and regards them as wrong and deplorable and dissociates itself, including its judiciary, from them. The GIHR brief conveys a fundamental misconception of the relationship between freedom of expression and the Convention. According to article 4 (a) of the Convention, the need to respect freedom of expression cannot be disregarded when States parties combat racism. It reiterates that German law conforms to article 4 (a) of the Convention and section 130 of the GCC provides for severe punishments in all cases of incitement to hatred, if the relevant act is capable of disturbing the public peace. The question of whether the relevant act is capable of disturbing the public peace has to be carefully assessed, in particular when freedom of expression is to be balanced against the necessity of combating racism. 10.2A statement which the petitioner perceives as racist does not automatically constitute an assault on human dignity within the meaning of section 130 of the GCC. GIHR appears to imply that the criterion of “capable of disturbing the public peace” is not relevant in this case, although it is a requirement in the GCC. It was legally necessary for the Prosecutor General to consider the position of the author of the incriminated statements, the weight of his opinion, his known political opinions and the role and distribution of the journal which published the interview when deciding whether the statements were likely to disturb the public peace. The debate generated by Mr. Sarrazin’s statements does not constitute a disturbance of the public peace. The State party firmly rejects the assertion by GIHR that the judiciary or any other State authority promotes the establishment and acceptance of racism in society. Issues and proceedings before the Committee