A/HRC/23/46 for ensuring the externalization of border controls, in exchange for tightly controlled and limited migration opportunities.25 68. The Special Rapporteur is concerned at the lack of clarity about the legal nature of such agreements. Not a binding treaty, they are essentially soft law instruments with a high degree of flexibility. Moreover, given their non-binding nature, there is no guarantee that participating member States, or the third country, will engage or comply with the initiatives or the commitments made, as no enforcement exists and there is no independent evaluation. In this context, there is no clear framework within which human rights are automatically incorporated into the mobility partnerships. To the contrary, their inherent nature as tailormade instruments will in fact prevent them from being an efficient instrument to promote a uniform human rights policy on migration with third countries. In addition, the opaque nature of the negotiations also means that human rights may not necessarily be mainstreamed therein. For example, mobility partnerships are negotiated with the Directorate-General Home Affairs, but also with the External Action Service (EEAS), which may in fact lead to some confusion between priorities, competences and eventually impact upon a coordinated integration of human rights into each of these programmes, particularly as the Directorate-General Home Affairs negotiates the readmission agreements, while it is EEAS which has the mandate on general human rights cooperation . 6. Insufficient responsibility sharing with external border States 69. The Special Rapporteur further observed the need for more responsibility-sharing with regards to migration within the European Union. Greece and Italy are two countries tasked with managing important external European Union borders, and are thus the recipients of large numbers of irregular migrants. Yet, under the current system, migrants found to be irregular at their point of entry to the European Union are fingerprinted in a biometric database (EURODAC). This can create a de facto situation where irreg u lar mig ran t s become stuck in border countries such as Italy and Greece. The Special Rapporteur met many such migrants, who, after entering the European Union and being fingerprinted, then moved on to establish lives for themselves in other EUMSs. However, upon being detected as irregular, they are returned to the border State which constituted their first point of entry, where often they had no ties or viable prospects. Moreover, these migrants often become trapped in these border States, as they are unable to travel to other countries within the European Union, or safely return home. 70. Secondly, the Dublin II regulation provides, as a general rule, t h at asylum claimants can only apply for asylum in their country of first entry to the European Union. As potential asylum seekers are often aware of this fact, they may avoid lodging a protection claim, and thus being fingerprinted, in their country of first entry to the European Union, in order to seek international protection in a member State where they believe they will have better long-term integration prospects and opportunities. In practice, this leads to persons with protection concerns avoiding lodging their claims, and seeking to continue their journeys, often by dangerous routes, to other European Union member States, thereby rendering them more vulnerable. 71. The Special Rapporteur thus notes that the operation of the Dublin system may, in fact, exacerbate the challenges for border States in managing an already overloaded asylum system, both in terms of reception conditions and the asylum procedure itself. And although article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for responsibility-sharing amongst European Union member States, the system devised under 25 European Commission, 3rd Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2011), Brussels, 30.5.2012, COM (2012) 250 final, pp. 9-10. See also annex para. 10. 17