A/HRC/23/46 incorporated therein. It appears that readmission agreements have been developed with third countries despite the lack of a well-functioning asylum system or the lack of resources or infrastructure to manage large inflows of migrants in a manner that would effectively ensure proper protection of human rights. Moreover, the agreements operate to oblige signatory countries to take back not only their own nationals but also third -country nationals, which may pose particular human rights concerns for those persons. 64. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur observes that these agreements are increasingly used as a negotiating tool by both the European Union and the signatory States – with strong incentives for both parties, including visa liberalization or facilitation agreements for the signatory, and readmission for the European Union. Neither consideration automatically incorporates human rights. As an example, before initialling the European Union-Turkey readmission agreement, Turkey stated that it expected a mandate to be given to the European Commission to initiate negotiations on visa exemption for Turkish citizens in the Schengen Area, and the Council invited the Commission to take steps towards visa liberalization as a gradual and long-term perspective, in parallel with the signing of the readmission agreement. However, the agreement focuses almost exclusively on combating immigration, and does not sufficiently ensure respect for the human rights of migrants. The Special Rapporteur has learnt that the Commission has recommended including a suspension clause in every readmission agreement that would provide for temporary suspension of readmission agreements in the event of persistent and serious risk of violation of human rights.23 This is an important mechanism that should certainly be systematically implemented. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur has been assured that visa liberalization processes are typically accompanied by action plans with sets of detailed benchmarks. The Special Rapporteur notes that these should also include explicit provisions for the human rights of migrants, including irregular migrants. 65. Secondly, there has been a proliferation of bilateral agreements between European Union member States and countries of origin or transit, often with the same goal – essentially to ensure the rapid return of migrants arriving in an individual European Union member State to the country from which they entered. As noted, in Italy, this trend became increasingly apparent, with readmission agreements signed between Italy an d Egypt and Tunisia without the incorporation of proper human rights guarantees for persons returned.24 The same applies to the Greece-Turkey readmission agreement. (c) Mobility partnerships 66. The Special Rapporteur further notes that within the framework o f GAMM, the mobility partnership model has been hailed as an innovative and sophisticated political tool to enhance tailor-made dialogue and cooperation with non-European Union countries in a wide range of fields related to migration and mobility. 67. However, the Special Rapporteur notes that the partnerships appear to be used as a means for the European Union to further pursue its agenda of strengthening border controls through preconditioning limited labour opportunities, largely for skilled migrants, and the promise of visa liberalization/facilitation, and on measures which effectively operate to externalize migration control. These include border control reforms, the conclusion of readmission agreements with the European Union, and the signing of working arrangements with Frontex. Moreover, the mobility partnerships seem to be premised on exchanging these measures against temporary migration opportunities for certain categories of workers. Viewed in this way, the mobility partnership can be described as a mechanism 23 24 16 COM(2011) 76 final, 23 February 2011. See A/HRC/23/46/Add.3.