A/66/156 interreligious projects while identifying itself with one particular religion or belief, this would almost inevitably lead to discrimination against followers of other religions or beliefs. In such a situation, encounters between communities on the basis of equality would be nearly impossible. The principle of State neutrality in questions of religion or belief has been and continues to be a matter of controversy. Neutrality has sometimes been portrayed as indicating a lack of State commitment in this field. Against such a misinterpretation of the concept of neutrality, however, the Special Rapporteur would point to the positive significance of that concept, which lies in the State’s obligation to be fair to the members of different religions or beliefs, on the basis of equality, and to refrain from any discriminatory treatment. State neutrality in this sense can be understood as a normative principle deriving from the obligation of a non-discriminatory implementation of freedom of religion or belief. Consequently, it should have an impact also on any promotional activities of the State in the area of interreligious communication. Again, there is evidence that some States fail to comply with this principle, with the effect that interreligious dialogue projects may in some cases amount to undue pressure placed by the State on members of religious or belief minorities. For instance, some State initiatives in interreligious dialogue were reportedly connected to pressure exercised on particular religious groups to limit their religious activities, pending recommendations from the respective Government ministries. 51. The sum total of State-promoted interreligious dialogue projects must, as far as possible, meet the criterion of conceptual inclusiveness. There is a legitimate diversity of dialogue settings, all of which may warrant State support. There may be good reasons for the State also to promote some concrete forms of “exclusive” bilateral communication, for example between certain religious or belief communities that have a history of mutual distrust. This does not in itself present a problem. However, the general balance of State support for interreligious communication should reflect the requirement of conceptual inclusiveness in the sense that all religious or belief groups that would like to participate and benefit from State support should get their fair share of attention and options. An important test question in this regard is the fair inclusion of groups that in a given society have traditionally been neglected, marginalized or completely ignored. Unfortunately, reports indicate that in many countries religious or belief minorities who would like to benefit from State-promoted dialogue continue to suffer from more or less systematic exclusion. 52. From a practical point of view, it may be virtually impossible to fully accomplish the requirement of the concept of inclusiveness. Paying more attention to the often underestimated potential of informal interreligious communication can, however, at least indirectly, help the State come closer to that benchmark. Since informal interreligious communication does not require individuals to identify themselves explicitly as members of a particular religious group, it has the advantage of being open to the participation of people adhering to typically neglected groups, including individuals generally less interested in, or less knowledgeable about, questions of religion or belief. This example reinforces the advisability of combining formal and informal communicative settings between individuals or groups of different religions or beliefs. 18 11-41943