CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996 Page 5 claims that such hardship significantly impairs, in a discriminatory fashion, the enjoyment of the right to manifest one's religion, including the freedom to provide a religious education for one's children, or to establish religious schools. 3.3 The author further points out that this violation is not sustainable under the limitation provisions of article 18(3), which only permits those limitations which are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedom of others. According to the author, a limitation established to protect morals may not be based on a single tradition. 3.4 The author further asserts that when a right to publicly financed religious education is recognized by a State party, no differentiation should be made on the basis of religion. The full and direct public funding of Roman Catholic schools in Ontario does not equally respect the liberty of non-Roman Catholics to choose an education in conformity with a parent's religious convictions, contrary to Article 18(4) taken together with Article 2. 3.5 The author states that Article 27 recognizes that separate school systems are crucial to the practice of religion, that these schools form an essential link in preserving community identity and the survival of minority religious groups and that positive action may be required to ensure that the rights of religious minorities are protected. Since Roman Catholics are the only religious minority to receive full and direct funding for religious education from the government of Ontario, Article 27 has not been applied, as required by Article 2, without distinction on the basis of religion. State party’s observations 4.1 By note of 29 April 1997, the State party agrees to the combined consideration of admissibility and merits of the communication by the Committee. 4.2 In its submission of February 1998, the State party denies that the facts of the case disclose violations of articles 2, 18, 26 and 17 of the Covenant. 4.3.1 With regard to the alleged violation of article 26, the State party contends the communication is inadmissible ratione materiae, or, in the alternative, does not constitute a violation. The State party recalls that a differentiation in treatment based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26. It refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence in communication No. 191/19852, where the Committee found that the State party was not violating article 26 by not providing the same level of subsidy for private and public education, when the private system was not subject to State supervision. It also refers to the Committee’s Views in communications Nos. 298/1988 and 299/19883, where the Committee decided that the State party could not be deemed to be under an obligation to provide the same benefits to private schools as to public schools, and that the preferential treatment given to public sector schooling was reasonable and based on objective criteria. The Committee also considered that 2 Blom v. Sweden, Views adopted on 4 April 1988, selected decisions volume 2, CCPR/C/OP/2. Lindgren and Lundquist v. Sweden, Views adopted on 9 November 1990 (CCPR/C/40/D/298-299/1988). 3