A/HRC/31/18 attacks, the experience of practical sympathy can help restore trust in society among members of the targeted minority after violence has been perpetrated. Acts of solidarity should include participation in funerals and visits to bereaved families. Again, government representatives have a particular responsibility to be visibly and credibly present in such critical situations. 4. Restrictive measures connected to high thresholds 54. As previously stated, the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to freedom of expression are not beyond limitations in the forum externum. However, bearing in mind the special rank of these “inalienable” rights as well as their practical significance for creating a culture of trustful communication and public discourse, limitations should always be drawn with caution and must be fully in line with international human rights standards. Among the criteria required for restrictions to be justifiable, these measures must actually prove “necessary” for achieving one of the enumerated legitimate aims. The principle of necessity implies that certain restrictive measures cannot be legitimate if less far-reaching interventions could accomplish the same results. 55. Unfortunately, realities in many countries differ from those standards. The Special Rapporteur was repeatedly surprised that some Governments all too quickly resort to restrictive measures in their fight against religious intolerance, often without even trying to explore the potential of communicative counter-strategies. Rather than using communicative counter-strategies and forming broad alliances with different societal stakeholders in creating a culture of open-mindedness against religious intolerance, some Governments seem to see their leadership role chiefly as passing and enforcing criminal legislation. However, this means turning the sequence of measures upside down. From the perspective of freedom of religion or belief, seen in conjunction with freedom of expression, the primacy of non-restrictive policies should always be upheld. Moreover, restrictive measures if deemed necessary must meet all the criteria laid down in articles 18 (3) and 19 (3) of the Covenant, as developed above. 56. Another important norm, which has recently attracted more attention, is article 20 (2) of the Covenant, which states that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. The title and the text of Council resolution 16/18 reflect the renewed awareness of this norm. In its general comment No. 34, the Human Rights Committee emphasizes that prohibitions enacted in the name of article 20 (2) must comply “with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26” (para. 48). This means that, besides preserving all the guarantees enshrined in article 19 (3) of the Covenant, which can never be circumvented by invoking article 20 (2), prohibitions must be precisely defined and must be enacted without any discriminatory intention or effect. 57. Article 20 (2) of the Covenant is also reflected in the title of the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. In appreciation of the special rank of the right to freedom of expression, the Rabat Plan of Action clarifies that “article 20 of the Covenant requires a high threshold because, as a matter of fundamental principle, limitation of speech must remain an exception”.17 In order to further spell out the required threshold, the Rabat Plan of Action proposes a six-element test which should support the judiciary in assessing whether concrete acts of hate speech actually amount to “incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” and are serious enough to be considered as criminal 17 See A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix, para. 18. 15