A/HRC/58/54 of minorities within each State, and not internationally. Nevertheless, failing to recognize the specificity of the identity issue of minorities at the United Nations level is a collective failure of the United Nations system and Member States, at odds with the affirmation that “the United Nations cannot remain indifferent to the fate of minorities”11 and the commitment collectively made in the adoption of the Declaration. B. Is there a right to identity belonging to minorities? 38. In 2006, in her first report on minority issues 12 presented to the Commission on Human Rights, the independent expert on minority issues stated: “The independent expert also takes note of the collective nature of minority rights. This holds importance for the promotion and protection of minority identity and visibility, for the informed collective participation of these groups in decisions that affect their rights and resources, and for securing collective claims to linguistically and culturally appropriate education, land and other shared assets. While the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities examines rights that may be claimed by individual members of minority communities, those claims will often require the State to ensure the existence or identity of the group as a whole.13 39. The legal complexity of minority rights in international law is fully encompassed in that paragraph. In 2006, the independent expert “takes note of the collective nature of minority rights”, while acknowledging that “the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities examines rights that may be claimed by individual members of minority communities”, with the consequence that “those claims will often require the State to ensure the existence or identity of the group as a whole”. Revisiting the issue in 2025, the Special Rapporteur will aim at disentangling this legal conundrum of respective rights and duties of persons belonging to minorities, minority groups themselves and Member States – the latter having universally endorsed the Declaration. Is it then possible, from the wording of article 1 of the Declaration, to infer that a right to identity belongs to minorities? Or does such right belong to persons belonging to minorities? Or both? 40. The idea of minority groups (minorities themselves) as collective rights holders – including a right to identity – is not accepted generally in the legal doctrine, nor is it accepted by States themselves. Such reluctance relates to the wording of the Declaration, but even more fundamentally to the “concept of rights” as it exists in contemporary positive law. As regards the wording of the Declaration, one cannot ignore that the Declaration is not about minority rights, but, as its title indicates, about the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. In the wording of its articles, the Declaration does not recognize the rights of minorities themselves, but rather the rights of persons belonging to minorities,14 while also imposing duties on States.15 41. Actually, the current “concept of law”,16 or, even more precisely, the “concept of rights”, is based on an understanding of “subjective rights”;17 meaning that a right exists only if it can be claimed by a legal person (subject or holder of rights). Currently, collective legal persons do not exist in positive international law.18 This mechanism limiting subjective rights to single persons is well illustrated by the first words of the Constitution of the United States 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 6 See General Assembly resolution 217 C (III). By its resolution 2005/79, the Commission on Human Rights created the special procedure on minority issues, with a mandate given for two years to an independent expert. E/CN.4/2006/74, para. 27. Arts. 2 and 3. Arts. 1 and 4. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961). Thomas Mautner, “How rights became ‘subjective’”, Ratio Juris, vol. 26, No. 1 (March 2013), pp. 111–132. Some authors consider “peoples” (as referred to in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations) as collective subjects of international law; see Iryna Kresina and Oleksii Kresin, “The people as subject of international law”, Jus Gentium: Journal of International Legal History, vol. 3, No. 2 (July 2018), pp. 573–598. GE.25-00509