E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.1 page 6 observe Saturday as the Sabbath and are therefore required to be closed two days of the week rather than one). In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 US 972 (1990) (state drug laws may be applied to bar the sacramental ingestion of controlled substances such as peyote), the Supreme Court decided that neutral laws of general applicability do not typically offend the free exercise clause merely because in application they incidentally prohibit the exercise of someone's religion. Government no longer has to demonstrate a compelling interest unless a law is specifically targeted at a religious practice or infringes upon an additional constitutional right. 13. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 was enacted by the Congress in order to subject all laws to the strict scrutiny that the Smith case for the most part abandoned. The Act provides that the Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the Government demonstrates that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 14. In Boerne v. Flores, 117 S Ct 2157 (1997), the Supreme Court declared the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional because Congress cannot adopt a standard of protection different from that provided by the Constitution unless there is some proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end. The Act was also considered as a congressional intrusion into the traditional prerogatives and general authority of the states to regulate the health and welfare of their citizens. 15. During the Special Rapporteur's mission, many representatives of non-governmental organizations, both religious and secular, particularly in the field of human rights, stress the need for legislation along the lines of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in order to remedy the decision in the Smith case, regarded as a mistaken interpretation by the Supreme Court which is prejudicial to the freedom of religion and belief, particularly for religious minorities. According to these representatives, the decision in the Smith case means that freedom of religion and belief is and may be affected for the following reasons: (a) In the past, formally neutral, generally applicable laws were used to persecute minorities (in 1925, an Oregon law requiring public education for all children was aimed at closing Catholic private schools; the laws against polygamy led to laws dissolving the Mormon Church and its properties; laws in the years 1930-1950 requiring the Pledge of Allegiance led to violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses). As one of the Special Rapporteur’s interlocutors noted, “These laws were enacted originally for legitimate reasons, but when they were enforced against religious minorities, they fanned the flames of persecution”; (b) Jurisprudence since the Smith case is prejudicial to religious minorities (see Yang v. Sturner (1990): an autopsy performed on a follower of the Hmong religion, which views autopsies as a mutilation of the body which prevents the release of the spirit, was not a violation of free exercise rights because the statute governing autopsies was generally applicable and formally neutral, thus constitutional; Munn v. Algee (1991), etc.);