A/HRC/46/57/Add.1 teaching of Kyrgyz as a second language, and re-establish university admission tests in the Uzbek language. 46. While some observers have been supportive of the 2017–2030 programme on multilingual education, the Special Rapporteur has concerns that it may be implemented to dilute education in minority languages, and is not expected to be applied to most majoritylanguage public schools. When he had an opportunity to speak to individuals involved in a trilingual public school in a region with a large Uzbek minority community, the Special Rapporteur was informed that in practice the main languages of instruction were now in fact Kyrgyz and Russian, and that over the years the use of the Uzbek language had essentially been set aside, despite the assurances made to the Special Rapporteur in the capital that this school was one of the country’s “multilingual success stories”. The Special Rapporteur was unable to obtain any information on multilingual education to suggest that minority languages other than Russian would in practice be used as mediums of instruction. 47. The Special Rapporteur would like to emphasize that other United Nations monitoring mechanisms have also previously noted the decrease in the use of minority languages in education, including as a medium of instruction. E. Disaggregated data and the “invisibility” of minorities 48. Kyrgyzstan does not systematically collect disaggregated data on its population, languages, cultures or religions. This is not helpful for public authorities when it comes to having precise information on the population of a country to design better-targeted and effective evidence-based policies and programmes. As the Special Rapporteur has maintained on previous country visits, such data allow governments to plan programmes so as to reach those most in need and to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of such programmes, and this is particularly true as regards measuring the impact of policies and programmes for those who are most vulnerable and marginalized, including minorities. 49. The Special Rapporteur was advised by government officials that disaggregated data on the employment of minorities in some sections of the civil service was available, but that for reasons of “confidentiality” or “security” this information would not be shared. Some officials assured the Special Rapporteur that minorities were well represented, but stated that this information was secret and could not be released to him. Although it is possible that some progress has been made, the absence of disaggregated data, and in some cases the refusal to provide to the Special Rapporteur with updated data where it may exist, would suggest there has been no marked improvement in the situation. Some civil society representatives expressed the opinion, based on their observations despite the absence of official disaggregated data, that the proportion of minorities in sections of the civil service, particularly in the State’s security apparatus, had in fact been in decline. The Special Rapporteur has no reason to disbelieve the views expressed by civil society observers, in light of the refusal of some officials to share available data. F. Participation of minorities in public life and presence in the civil service 50. The participation of minorities in public life in Kyrgyzstan is extremely limited compared to the proportion of these minorities in the total population. In the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), 90 per cent of members are ethnic Kyrgyz and 5 per cent ethnic Russian. Dungans have two Members of Parliament, whereas Kazakhs, Tatars and Uighurs have one member each. Although Uzbeks represent more than 14 per cent of the population, only three Members of Parliament are members of the Uzbek minority. 51. On the positive side, since the October 2015 elections, the electoral law has prescribed a 15 per cent quota for minority representation on political party lists. However, it has been suggested to the Special Rapporteur that the legal reforms aimed at enhancing parliamentary representation have so far been timid and largely ineffective. While the above-mentioned quota at least symbolically ensures a degree of visibility for a handful of the 100 or so minority groups in the country, the Special Rapporteur was informed that in practice this does not go very far in terms of ensuring a proportional presence reflective of the country’s 9