CYPRUS v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MARCUS-HELMONS 121 established by the “TRNC”, (b) it would be in the interest of all the inhabitants of northern Cyprus, including Greek Cypriots, to seek the protection of those courts, (c) had the “TRNC” not established those courts, it would have violated the European Convention and (d) as a result, the inhabitants of the “TRNC” would have been under an obligation to exhaust the remedies provided by those courts. 6. Paragraphs 95 and 96 of the judgment are to my mind inopportune, as in its Opinion in the case of Namibia the ICJ was clear and deliberately succinct. There appears to be no need to “add to” the text of the majority of the ICJ by referring to individual opinions expressed by some of the judges and to arguments made during the pleadings, especially if the result is to give paragraph 125 of the Opinion greater scope than that intended by the majority in the ICJ. 7. Lastly, in paragraph 97 of the judgment the Court seems to jump to hasty and ill-advised conclusions which it considers to be a widely held opinion on this subject. As evidence of this, one need only examine, among other sources, the case-law of the Supreme Court of the United States on the validity of the confederate acts of the South during the Civil War. It should be noted that the southern authorities were legal until they seceded (the position thus being totally different from one in which courts are illegally established after a military invasion by a neighbouring State). Shortly after the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court recognised in the cases of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 227; 7 Wall.700 (1868) ; Horn v. Lockhart, 21 L.ed. 658 ; 17 Wall. 570 (1873) and Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 178 (1878) and within very strict limits that the administrative acts and judgments of the confederate courts had some validity to the extent that their aim and execution did not conflict with the authority of the national Government and did not infringe citizens' constitutional rights. Those limited effects given retrospectively were strictly reserved to habitual acts necessary for the proper functioning of life in society. In the more recent case of Adams v. Adams ([1970] 3 Weekly Law Reports 934), the English High Court categorically refused to recognise any effect for the acts of the secessionist government concerned (the former Rhodesian government following the adoption of a unilateral declaration of independence). The European Convention on Human Rights 1. I should like to point out that this is a special situation. The Convention is a lex specialis whose special features must be respected and which is amenable to reasoning by analogy only in situations that are on all fours with each other (which is evidently not the case with the Advisory Opinion in the case of Namibia). 2. An analysis of the travaux préparatoires on the European Convention (Doc. Council of Europe, secret H (61) 4) reveals that, while domestic remedies were naturally required to be exhausted before applications were