104 CYPRUS v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION of the judgment), complaints concerning Turkish-Cypriot political opponents and Gypsies (paragraphs 342-53 of the judgment) and the alleged violation of Article 13 in respect of these complaints (paragraphs 378-83 of the judgment). 1. Articles 6 and 13 The Court reaches the conclusion that no violation of Article 6 has been established “by reason of an alleged practice” as regards the claim that the members of the enclaved Greek-Cypriot population were denied their right to have their civil rights and obligations determined by independent and impartial courts established by law (paragraphs 233-40 of the judgment). In doing so, it endorsed the Commission's conclusion on the facts that there was nothing in the framework of the “TRNC” legal system to cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of the judges and that the courts functioned on the basis of the domestic law of the “TRNC”. Apart from the difficulties inherent in the recognition of the “TRNC” framework which I have alluded to above, the conclusion reached sits ill with the Court's general findings in respect of the enclaved Greek-Cypriot community of multiple grave breaches of the provisions of the Convention (Articles 3, 9, 10 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1). The Court accepts that the enclaved Greek Cypriots are “compelled to live in a hostile environment in which it is hardly possible to lead a normal private and family life” (paragraph 300). It also finds that this population is the victim of discriminatory and degrading treatment based on ethnic origin, race and religion and that its members are compelled to live “isolated, restricted in their movements, controlled and with no prospect of renewing or developing their community” (paragraph 309). When one stands away from the legal detail supporting these conclusions, the Court accepts the general picture of a dwindling and aged community that has been subjected to a substantial reduction of the Convention rights of its members under colour of a policy of ethnic separation. The Court, furthermore, agrees with the observations of the UN Secretary-General that the restrictions will have the inevitable effect that the community will cease to exist (paragraph 307). In such a context, is it realistic to say that the members of this community have access to the courts in respect of their civil claims? Is it a credible proposition that there exists a haven of juridical relief ready and able to defend the rights of this beleaguered population notwithstanding the existence of an official policy of containment and oppression? I would very much like to believe that the courts could and would function in this manner but, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary – as opposed to a