CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 5.2 The author reiterates that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s death c onstitutes a violation of the right to life enshrined in article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to effective protection of women’s rights, and the right to health, under articles 2 (c) and 12 of the Convention. Mor e specifically, the State party has not ensured access to quality medical treatment during delivery and to timely emergency obstetric care, implicating the right to non -discrimination based on gender and race. The inability of her family to obtain reparati ons from the State party violates the right to effective protection. 5.3 The author challenges the State party’s assertion that the case has not extended beyond the normal time frame for legal actions of this nature, implicitly arguing that the case thereby does not fall within the “unreasonably prolonged” exception to the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. This argument ignores the significant delays imposed by the State party that have effectively barred the petitioner from resolving her case in a domestic court. The family originally filed a petition for material and moral damages on 11 February 2003, just three months after the death. Almost eight years have elapsed since this petition was filed, but judicial activity on the case has been minimal and it is not clear when the court will reach a decision. The State party does not adequately address the unreasonably prolonged delay in its comments, stating only that the case is currently in the judgement phase following oral arguments by both parties and that “unjustified delays in concluding the case” are unlikely. However, it is uncontested that the legal action was filed on 11 February 2003 and that the expert’s work was not completed until August 2007, over four years later. Furthermore, contrary to the statement by the State party that a judgement on the merits would be issued in July 2008, such a judgement has yet to occur. The author argues therefore that the failure to reach a conclusion on the merits of the domestic case can no longe r be considered reasonable and refers to, inter alia, the case of A.T. v. Hungary, where the Committee found that a three-year delay in a domestic violence case amounted to an unreasonably prolonged delay within the meaning of article 4, paragraph 1, of th e Optional Protocol. 8 The author further refers to the Committee’s statement in the same case that domestic violence cases in the State in question do not enjoy priority in judicial proceedings and argues that this finding is analogous to the situation in the State party, where proceedings involving violence against women and women’s health, especially with regard to women from vulnerable groups, including women from low socio-economic backgrounds and of African descent, are not prioritized in the court system. 9 Moreover, the State party did not clarify why appointing one medical expert should make the case an exceedingly complex one. The family did not act to protract the lengthy judicial proceedings and the conduct of state and judicial authorities has been the primary reason for the unreasonable prolongation of the case. First, it took the domestic court almost four years to appoint a final medical expert, even though court rules require such an appointment within a period of 10 days. Secondly, even after the eventual completion of the expert work and statements by both parties, more than one year has elapsed and Brazil has not met its own deadline for declaring a judgement on the merits. Thirdly, Brazil does not address the significant judicial delays in the family’s use of the provisional remedy of tutela antecipada. __________________ 8 9 11-51699 Communication No. 2/2003, A.T. v. Hungary, views adopted on 26 January 2005, para. 8.4. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, paras. 208, 212, 213, 215 and 216 (2007). 13