CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019 it must in any event be applicable in such a way as to indicate that the individual’s risk of being affected is more than a theoretical possibility. 32 7.10 The Committee notes that the authors presented in their communication information indicating the existence of real predicaments that they have experienced personally and actually owing to disruptive climate events and slow-onset processes such as flooding and erosion. The authors argue in part that those predicaments have already compromised their ability to maintain their livelihoods, subsistence and culture. While noting the State party’s argument that the authors have not substantiated that present and future climate change impacts and the State party’s role in mitigating those impacts have violated the authors’ rights under the Covenant, the Committee observes that the authors, as members of peoples who are the long-standing inhabitants of traditional lands consisting of small, low-lying islands which presumably offer scant opportunities for safe internal relocation, are highly exposed to adverse climate change impacts. It is uncontested that the authors’ lives and cultures are highly dependent on the availability of the limited natural resources to which they have access and on the predictability of the natural phenomena that surround them. The Committee observes that in the light of their limited resources and location, the authors would be unlikely to be able to finance adequate adaptation measures themselves, on an individual or community level, to adjust to actual or expected climate change and its effects in order to moderate harm. The Committee therefore considers that the authors are among those who are extremely vulnerable to experiencing severely disruptive climate change impacts intensely. The Committee considers, based on the information provided by the authors, that the risk of impairment of those rights, owing to alleged serious adverse impacts that have already occurred and are ongoing, is more than a theoretical possibility. The Committee accordingly considers that articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol do not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the Covenant. 7.11 The Committee therefore declares the authors’ claims under articles 6, 17, 24 (1) and 27 of the Covenant admissible and proceeds to examine them on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided for under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee notes the authors’ claim that, by failing to implement adequate mitigation and adaptation measures to prevent negative climate change impacts on the authors and the islands where they live, the State party has violated their rights under the Covenant. Article 6 8.3 The Committee notes the authors’ claim that the events in this case constitute a violation by act and omission of their right to a life with dignity under article 6 of the Covenant, owing to the State party’s failure to perform its duty to provide adaptation and mitigation measures to address climate change impacts that adversely affect their lives, including their way of life. With respect to the State party’s position that article 6 (1) of the Covenant does not obligate it to prevent foreseeable loss of life from climate change, the Committee recalls that the right to life cannot be properly understood if it is interpreted in a restrictive manner and that the protection of that right requires States parties to adopt positive measures to protect the right to life.33 The Committee also recalls its general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, in which it established that the right to life also includes the right of individuals to enjoy a life with dignity and to be free from acts or omissions that would cause their unnatural or premature death (para. 3).34 The Committee further recalls that the obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life.35 States parties 32 33 34 35 12 For example, Teitiota v. New Zealand, para. 8.4. For example, Teitiota v. New Zealand, para. 9.4; and Toussaint v. Canada (CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014), para. 11.3. See also Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, para. 7.3. Toussaint v. Canada, para. 11.3; and Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, para. 7.5.