CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019 party can offer protection.26 The alleged threat to the authors’ rights is a global phenomenon arising from myriad acts committed by innumerable private and State entities over decades which, unquestionably, are beyond the jurisdiction and control of the State party. It would be perverse if, to ensure that climate change does not impair the authors’ rights, the Covenant were to impose a duty or obligation on the State party that the State party could not hope to fulfil. Moreover, the authors acknowledge the multiplicity of global causes of climate change, and that there is still the opportunity for mitigating factors at the national and global levels to intervene in order to allay the threat posed by its future impacts. 6.8 Any positive obligation that arises under the Covenant is limited principally to the threat posed by the acts of private persons or entities within a State party’s jurisdiction and control. This could also extend to positive obligations in respect of environmental issues that pose a direct, specific and objective threat to the enjoyment of Covenant rights, such as the use of pesticides (as in Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay), where it is within the scope of a State’s power to avert that risk. It does not, however, create an obligation to protect generally against the future effects of climate change, which, as a matter of international law, extend well beyond the scope of a single State party’s jurisdiction and control. 6.9 Academic scholars have noted that “causal pathways involving anthropogenic climate change, and especially its impacts, are intricate and diffuse” and that human rights law “cannot actually address the depth and breadth of the causes and impacts of climate change”.27 A threat that is not attributable to a State cannot be ensured or protected against by that State in cases where such protection cannot be achieved by the State alone. 6.10 Positive obligations under the Covenant do not require the maximum deployment of possible resources or the realization of the highest possible ambition. To adopt such an unprecedented test would not only place an impossible burden on States but also displace reasonable policy choices made in good faith by States as they assess a range of threats and challenges that have an impact on the enjoyment of human rights under the Covenant and decide how to distribute limited resources to address them. 6.11 It would be both inappropriate and unfounded for the Committee to interpret the Covenant in such a way as to allow it to remake the informed, good faith and difficult policy decisions of a democratically elected Government which inherently involve compromises, trade-offs and the allocation of limited resources across the range of challenges to the full enjoyment of human rights. In urging the Committee to adopt an unduly broad interpretation of a positive obligation, the authors invite the Committee to disregard States’ discretion in making relevant decisions, even if exercised in good faith. Fulfilment of positive obligations under the Covenant must recognize competing challenges to limited State resources. 6.12 The authors’ claims under article 27 of the Covenant are both factually and legally incorrect. The State party is taking measures to prevent the islands from becoming unviable for habitation through the adaptation and mitigation measures described at length in its observations. The State party provides detailed information on legislation, policies and practices designed to protect the cultural rights of Torres Strait islanders. Such measures include the Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Act 2003 (Qld), the Torres Strait Islander Traditional Child Rearing Practice Act 2020 (Qld), the Traditional Ecological Knowledge Project of the Torres Strait Regional Authority, the declaration of three Indigenous protected areas in the Torres Strait region, the use of Torres Strait infrastructure and housing, Indigenous land-use agreements, and the Local Thriving Communities programme. As a matter of international law, article 27 of the Covenant does not involve any positive obligation to prevent slow-onset risks that might arise in the future. A breach of article 27 of the Covenant arises only at the time of any denial; it does not convert a risk of future denial into a present breach. Even if the Committee were to admit an intergenerational element of 26 27 The State party provided detailed information in its submission on the measures it has taken to address the harmful effects of climate change. For example, Fanny Thornton, “The absurdity of relying on human rights law to go after emitters”, in Debating Climate Law, Benoit Mayer and Alexander Zahar, eds. (Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 159. 9