E/CN.4/2004/18/Add.3 page 14 security” strategy. This relationship of suspicion, mistrust and even hostility towards these organizations was the subject of a statement made by President Uribe on 8 September 2003, in which he reacted to criticism of his policy of democratic security by referring to human rights defenders as “traffickers in human rights, […] writers and political intriguers who support terrorism and who cowardly hide behind the banner of human rights” (traficantes de derechos humanos, […] escritores y politiqueros que sirven al terrorismo y que se escudan cobardemente en la bandera de los derechos humanos). 45. All the armed groups also make use of the population for their political and strategic ends. Basing themselves not on democratic but on ideological and political legitimacy, these groups consider that the population, whose higher interests they believe they are defending, has no other choice than to accept the ideology of the armed groups, provide them with active support and take part in their military activities and operations. 46. As the sacrificial victim of these Manichaean strategies, the population consequently bears the full brunt of all forms of violence: displacement, kidnapping, murder, public execution, torture and so on. The indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are at the centre of this violence, owing to their political, economic and social vulnerability caused by longstanding and far-reaching discrimination and the fact that their old and often tribal settlements are situated in geographical areas considered as strategic by the different groups involved in violence in Colombia. B. Ethnic and racial dimensions of the armed conflict 47. The presence of indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities in regions with a growing economic and strategic importance that coincide with the conflict zones (Pacific coast, Darien zone) make them highly vulnerable to socio-political violence. Indigenous peoples account for 3.75 per cent of the displaced population (estimated by the Government to be between 890,000 and 3 million), while they represent only 2 per cent of the total population. The ethnic groups Embera, Nasas, Kankuamos, Ingas, Embera Chami, Embera Catio and Pijaos in the departments of Chocó, Cauca, César, Putumayo, Córdoba, Antioquia, Tolima, Arauca and Cauca are the most affected (see appendix). Moreover, the leaders of these peoples are routinely assassinated by the guerrillas or the paramilitaries. Between 2002 and the first half of 2003, the Kankuamo people of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in particular paid a heavy price: 51 of its members were murdered; 36 murders are attributed to paramilitary groups, 10 to guerrillas and 5 to unidentified persons.8 48. Afro-Colombians account for 17 per cent of displaced persons.9 The Special Rapporteur was able to witness this strong presence among displaced persons in the streets of Bogotá and Cali, where they engage in informal trade, and in Cartagena, where he visited the communities of Pablo VI Segundo and El Posón. Afro-Colombian leaders and prominent figures are also assassinated or threatened by the guerrillas or paramilitaries. 49. As the Special Rapporteur on violence against women has already pointed out (E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3, paras. 66-73), women, particularly indigenous and Afro-Colombian women, suffer most from the conflict and account for 48 per cent of displaced persons. Children between the ages of 5 and 14 are also severely affected and constitute 75 per cent of the