A/75/590 quarter of attempted readouts fail technically, and even if readouts are successful, most of the evaluation reports are unusable because the set of data reviewed is too small or otherwise inconclusive. 77 Among 21,505 mobile phones successfully read out in 2018 and 2019, only about 118 cases, or 0.55 per cent, indicated a contradiction. 78 Furthermore, since neither the algorithms nor the training data are known to the public, judges and other decision makers cannot properly assess their reliability. 79 30. Although regulations such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation seek to protect data and privacy, some States create exemptions in the immigration enforcement context. Two submissions noted relevant exemptions from the General Data Protection Regulation in the Data Protection Act 2018, of the United Kingdom. 80 Under this “immigration exemption”, an entity with the power to process data, known as a “data controller”, may circumvent core rights of an individual around data access if to do otherwise would “prejudice effective immigration control”. 81 These rights include the rights to object to and restrict the processing of one’s data and the right to have one’s personal data deleted. 82 The exemption also frees data controllers from their responsibility to provide information to the individuals concerned when their data are collected, including from other sources, like a school, employer or local authority. 83 In the United Kingdom, the amended Police Act empowers not only police but also immigration officers to interfere with mobile phones and other electronic devices belonging to asylum seekers. 84 Going far beyond even the data carrier evaluation permitted in Germany, the Crime and Courts Act 2013, of the United Kingdom, enables police and im migration officers to carry out secret surveillance measures, place bugging devices, and hack and search mobile phones and computers. 85 The individuals affected will disproportionately be targeted on national origin grounds when national origin should neve r be a basis for diminished privacy and other rights. B. Discriminatory structures 31. In her report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur provided examples of how the design and use of different emerging digital technologies could be combined intentionally and unintentionally to produce racially discriminatory structures that holistically or systematically undermined enjoyment of human rights for certain groups, on account of their race, ethnicity or national origin, in combination with other characteristics. In other words, rather than only viewing emerging digital technologies as capable of undercutting access to and enjoyment of discrete human rights, she urged that they should also be understood as capable of creating and sustaining racial and ethnic exclusion in systemic or structural terms. In this subsection, the Special Rapporteur highlights ways in which migrants, refugees, stateless persons and related groups are being subjected to technological interventions that expose them to a broad range of actual and potential rights violations on the basis of actual or perceived national origin or immigration status. __________________ 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 14/25 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.; and submission by Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants. Submission by Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants. Ibid. Ibid. Submission by Geselleschaft für Freiheitsrechte. Ibid. 20-14872