CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011 and sought a general declaratory statement rather than compensation for a specific violation. According to its jurisprudence, the Committee does not assess hypothetical or potential violations of the Covenant. 4.7 The communication falls outside the scope of the Covenant since, according to the Committee’s jurisprudence, an individual cannot compel the State to commence criminal proceedings against a third person or to impose punishment. 4.8 The State party noted that in December 2014, the Public Prosecution Service initiated criminal proceedings against Mr. Wilders for insulting a group of persons and inciting discrimination and hatred against persons on account of their race, for statements by him concerning persons of Moroccan descent made in The Hague on 12 and 19 March 2014. Authors’ comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility 5.1 The authors submitted comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility on 20 March 2012 and 30 November 2015. Regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies, they argue that a civil proceeding must be considered ineffective. The Netherlands implemented article 20 (2) of the Covenant through article 137d of the Criminal Code. The authors are not seeking compensation; they sought a judgment against Mr. Wilders by a criminal court for the important and distinct public force of a verdict establishing guilt or innocence. 5.2 Mr. Rabbae argues that he is a direct victim of Mr. Wilders’ hate speech because he is affected as a Muslim, a Moroccan and incidentally, as the chairman of a national consultative body. With regard to the impact of Mr. Wilders’ hate speech on their personal lives, the authors reiterate that N.A. and A.B.S. reported their experiences during the domestic proceedings and Mr. Rabbae reported the hate speech directed against him to the police. The communication is not an actio popularis. 5.3 The communication is not inadmissible ratione materiae. The authors invoked articles 20 (2), 26 and 27 of the Covenant. Their communication thus clearly falls within the scope of the Covenant. 5.4 Article 20 (2) not only imposes an obligation on States to legislate against hate speech, but must also give individuals the right to be protected from it. Article 4 of the the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is also couched in terms of States’ obligations rather than individuals’ rights, but that has not prevented the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination from declaring admissible claims invoking violations of that provision. If the Committee nevertheless finds that such individual protection is not given under article 20, it should be interpreted to be provided by article 17. The authors argue that they have emphasized their collective right to identity by invoking article 20 in connection with articles 26 and 27. However, an infringement on one’s individual identity, such as racial defamation, also influences one’s capacity and freedom to enjoy one’s collective identity, and vice versa. Accordingly, the State party’s actions also violate article 17, interpreted in the light of article 20 (2). 5.5 Regarding the proceedings initiated against Mr. Wilders in December 2014, the prosecutor decided to prosecute Mr. Wilders again only after there was public outcry over his behaviour. State party’s observations on the merits 6.1 The State party submitted its observations on the merits on 28 May 2015. It rejects the authors’ contention under article 2 (3) of the Covenant that Mr. Wilders’ acquittal did not constitute effective enforcement of legislation. The authors had the opportunity to lodge a complaint against the prosecutor’s decision not to investigate and the various legal arguments relevant to the criminality of Mr. Wilders’ statements were addressed at length 8