E/C.12/74/D/70/2018 are all remedies available in direct relation to the events that initially gave rise to the alleged violation and that, prima facie, may be reasonably considered effective means of remedying the alleged violations of the Covenant.9 The Committee notes that the principal claim made by the author in her communication is that, because she had no alternative housing, evicting her was a violation of the Covenant. Therefore, the remedies that must be exhausted are, first and foremost, those directly related to the eviction, such as remedies aimed at preventing or delaying the eviction or serving to notify the courts of the lack of alternative housing.10 In this regard, the Committee notes that the author exhausted all the available remedies intended to prevent or delay the eviction, as she challenged the conviction of 21 December 2017 and requested the suspension of the eviction on repeated occasions, informing the authorities that she did not have alternative housing. 6.5 The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the author did not petition the Constitutional Court for amparo in connection with her conviction on charges of encroachment. However, the Committee observes that being granted amparo as a remedy for having been convicted of encroachment would not be an effective remedy for the alleged violation of the right to adequate housing.11 The Committee therefore concludes that, with respect to the author’s claim relating to the eviction, all available domestic remedies have been exhausted, as required under article 3 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 6.6 The Committee notes that the communication meets the other admissibility requirements under articles 2 and 3 of the Optional Protocol and, accordingly, declares the communication admissible and proceeds to its consideration on the merits. C. Committee’s consideration of the merits Facts and legal issues 7.1 The Committee has considered the present communication, taking into account all the information provided to it, in accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee will proceed to consider which facts it deems established and relevant to the complaint. 7.3 Since 2014, the author had been living with her two children, born in 2009 and 2017, in a building owned by what was formerly known as the Madrid Social Housing Institute (now the Madrid Social Housing Agency). Because the author was in a precarious economic situation and did not have a stable job, she received unemployment benefits on several occasions. 7.4 On 15 October 2015, the author applied to the Agency for public housing for reasons of particular necessity, in accordance with Decree No. 52/2016; her application was received, but for reasons unknown it later expired, and the author was not informed of the expiration. 7.5 On 21 December 2017, the Leganés Trial and Investigation Court No. 8 found the author guilty of encroachment for the purpose of illegally occupying a dwelling, a minor offence, fined her €180 and ordered her evicted from the property. The Court was of the view that the author had been occupying the property illegally since April 2017 and interpreted her claims regarding her unstable housing situation and her inability to obtain housing on the private market as evidence of her knowledge of the unlawfulness of the occupation. It was also of the view that the author’s renovation of the apartment showed that she had the savings to obtain housing on her own, and that the author had family members with whom she could live, although it provided no specific information on this point. 7.6 The author lodged an appeal against the conviction with the Provincial High Court of Madrid, arguing that she had occupied the apartment because the authorities were taking too 9 10 11 GE.23-20361 Hernández Cortés et al. v. Spain (E/C.12/72/D/26/2018), para. 6.2, and Moreno Romero et al. v. Spain (E/C.12/69/D/48/2018), para. 8.2. Moreno Romero et al. v. Spain, para. 8.2. Martínez Fernández v. Spain (E/C.12/64/D/19/2016), para. 6.3. 7