E/C.12/74/D/70/2018 Right to be heard, best interests of the child and disproportionate impact 12.1 The Committee also notes that, at the time of the eviction order, the author’s children were 11 months old and 9 years old. The Committee therefore considers it necessary to point out that, as the best interests of the child or adolescent must be a primary consideration in all decisions affecting the child or adolescent, the decision-making process must include an evaluation of the possible impact (positive or negative) of the decision on the child or adolescent concerned.43 The justification of a decision must show that this right has been explicitly taken into account.44 States parties must ensure that, in all decisions affecting the interests of children and adolescents, their best interests are adequately and systematically assessed.45 This obligation is especially important in the face of enforcement measures, such as forced evictions, that cause children disproportionate suffering.46 12.2 Accordingly, the Committee notes that, although the eviction was suspended twice, taking into account the children’s health and schooling, it cannot be concluded from the rulings of Trial Court No. 8 or the Provincial High Court that the judicial authorities considered the best interests of the author’s children when ordering the eviction. The arguments made in those rulings do not show that the courts in question undertook a specific analysis of how an eviction could affect the author’s children or what the best decision would be, considering that, pursuant to article 10 (3) of the Covenant, special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on their behalf. 12.3 The Committee also notes that, in view of the principle of progressive autonomy, the children should have been heard in the proceedings but were not. The courts also failed to take into account the author’s situation as a female head of household with two children who was on a precarious economic footing and the disproportionate impact that the eviction would have on her and her children as a result of the discrimination faced by women, the lack of equal opportunities for access to adequate housing and to employment and the share, larger than that of men, of the caregiving burden that they bear. Interim measures and eviction of the author 13.1 On 26 October 2018, the Working Group on Communications, acting on behalf of the Committee, requested the State party to suspend the eviction of the author and her children while the communication was being considered or, alternatively, to grant them adequate housing in genuine and effective consultation with the author. Later, on 26 November 2018, the Committee, in view of the imminence of the eviction, reiterated the request for interim measures. 13.2 The Committee notes that, according to its jurisprudence, 47 the adoption of interim measures pursuant to article 5 of the Optional Protocol48 is vital to the Committee’s fulfilment of the responsibility entrusted to it under the Optional Protocol, as the reason for the existence of interim measures is, inter alia, to preserve the integrity of the process, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanism for protecting Covenant rights when there is a risk of irreparable damage. 49 Failure to adopt such interim measures is incompatible with the obligation to respect in good faith the procedure of individual communication established 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 GE.23-20361 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, para. 6 (c). Ibid. Ibid., para. 6 (a). Ibid., general comment No. 21 (2017) on children in street situations, para. 50. S.S.R. v. Spain (E/C.12/66/D/51/2018), paras. 7.6 and 7.7. Committee against Torture, Thirugnanasampanthar v. Australia (CAT/C/61/D/614/2014), para. 6.1. See also, mutatis mutandis, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (applications No. 46827/99 and No. 46951/99), judgment of 4 February 2005, para. 128 (“Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of an individual applicant’s right of application. A failure by a Contracting State to comply with interim measures is to be regarded as preventing the Court from effectively examining the applicant’s complaint and as hindering the effective exercise of his or her right and, accordingly, as a violation of article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights”); and Committee against Torture, Thirugnanasampanthar v. Australia, para. 6.1. 13