E/C.12/74/D/70/2018 right to adequate housing, and No. 7 (1997), on forced evictions, as they do not cover the eviction of persons convicted of encroachment. The offence of encroachment is defined in article 245 of the Criminal Code, and interpretations of this definition can be found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.4 In addition, encroachment involving a property that is not a dwelling is punishable under Spanish law only in the event of conduct that poses a substantial risk or danger to the interest protected under criminal law; a large number of precedents maintain, for example, that criminal charges of encroachment are disproportionate where the property occupied is abandoned or in poor repair. 5 Similarly, it has been asserted in legal precedents that the commission of the offence requires that the occupation be continuous over time; three days has been found not long enough to conclude that the offence has been committed. Likewise, precedent has frequently supported exemptions granted on the grounds of the state of necessity and consequent social vulnerability of the perpetrator of the offence. To benefit from such an exculpatory circumstance, the perpetrator must have been in a precarious economic situation when the offence was committed and must have been experiencing serious difficulties as a result of the poverty at the root of the unlawful occupation. Furthermore, the precarious situation must have lasted for a considerable period of time, and the offender must have been unable to find alternative means of meeting his or her housing needs during this time. Under Spanish case law, a potential state of necessity may also justify the temporary occupation of another person’s property but not the occupation of the property and residence therein for an extended period. 4.7 The State party submits that the present case does not involve tenure protected by article 11 of the Covenant and that the return of the property to its owner therefore does not constitute a forced eviction under article 11 of the Covenant or the Committee’s case law. Paragraph 3 of general comment No. 7 (1997) states that the prohibition on forced evictions does not apply to evictions carried out by force in accordance with the law and in conformity with the provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this regard, in his basic principles and guidelines on development-generated evictions and displacement,6 does not refer to cases of squatting. In paragraph 8 (a) of its general comment No. 4 (1991), the Committee lists only lawful forms of tenure. “Tenure”, it states, “takes a variety of forms, including rental (public and private) accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of land or property”. According to the State party, general comment No. 7 (1997) assumes that occupation is lawful when, in paragraph 11, it states that, whereas some evictions may be justifiable, such as in the case of persistent non-payment of rent or of damage to rented property without any reasonable cause, it is incumbent upon the relevant authorities to ensure that they are carried out in a manner warranted by a law which is compatible with the Covenant and that all the legal recourses and remedies are available to those affected. The State party submits that, in the present case, the author’s occupation was not one of the peaceful forms protected under article 11 of the Covenant. Any other consideration would be tantamount to legitimizing by way of the right to housing criminally unlawful conduct and a violation of the owner’s property rights. The State party notes that evictions are justified in the event of persistent non-payment of rent or damage to the rented property without any reasonable cause – that is, the tenant must comply with his or her obligations, and the right to adequate housing cannot be used as a shield to protect the tenant from the consequences of his or her failure to comply with the law, in particular when such non-compliance involves criminal conduct upon taking possession of property. The Committee has previously stated that the conditions that must be satisfied in order to receive social services must be reasonable and very carefully designed and that they must be communicated in a transparent, timely and complete manner to the applicant.7 Decree No. 52/2016 contains a provision expressly denying access to emergency accommodation to 4 5 6 7 GE.23-20361 See Supreme Court judgment No. 800/2014 of 12 November 2014. See Provincial High Court of Segovia ruling of 29 October 1998, Provincial High Court of Girona ruling of 5 February 1999 and Provincial High Court of Valencia ruling of 4 February 2000. A/HRC/4/18, annex I. Ben Djazia et al. v. Spain (E/C.12/61/D/5/2015), para. 17.2. 5