A/HRC/38/41 for independent bodies to monitor the entire process, thereby assuring greater transparency and accountability with regard to conditions for and the treatment of detainees. 48 The use of monitoring, however, in no way legitimizes forced deportation, which should be avoided whenever possible as an inherently degrading situation involving serious risks to the human rights of the detainee that might amount to torture. Good practices have shown that monitoring not only sheds light on conditions and treatment in detention; the mere presence of an external mechanism in itself has a strong deterrent effect and reduces the risks of torture and ill-treatment. Effective monitoring provides a further safeguard for all individuals, including those with particular protection needs, and can be instrumental in pressing and assisting the authorities to address and improve them. In this context, the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and national preventive mechanisms have, under article 4 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, a role to play, since they both have a mandate to monitor the entire deportation process.49 81. No one should be returned under a readmission agreement without effective oversight by an independent post-return human rights monitoring mechanism that ensures that the human rights of returnees are actually respected and provides for an accountability mechanism. The presence of embassy staff of the returning country may help upon arrival. For effective, transparent and independent monitoring of the post-return situation of those returned, ensuring participatory verification of well-being, and the reintegration and rights of returnees, national mechanisms should be developed. 82. Prior to any return procedure, migrants should receive adequate information on their rights and on the possibility to report any human rights violation they have endured. The Special Rapporteur notes the legitimate concerns regarding liability for human rights violations or other breaches of international law resulting from the externalization of States’ obligations through the actions of international or regional organizations during return procedures, such as IOM and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). In the case of the latter, States delegate the implementation of forced returns to a regional institution, which raises concerns with regard to liability. 50 International responsibility arises, however, for any internationally wrongful act attributable to an international organization that is in breach of an international obligation. 51 83. States and other stakeholders involved in return procedures should be held accountable for any human rights violations or other breaches of international law. An accountability mechanism should be put in place to ensure that violations of human rights are addressed, irrespective of whether they are committed by States or other stakeholders involved in the return and reintegration process. States should ensure that effective complaint and remedy mechanisms are also in place. 84. Migrants should have access to complaint mechanisms to report misconduct, violence or ill-treatment prior, during and after return. Although an individual complaints mechanism was introduced in European Union Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council (art. 72), the regulation is rather ineffective, since it largely relies on the discretionary powers of internal oversight bodies. It lacks a clear definition of what actually constitutes “appropriate follow-up” by Frontex or by States, and the role that a Frontex fundamental rights officer can play in follow-up.52 85. Access to justice after return should also be ensured for any human rights violations suffered by labour migrants, who should be certain that claims for unpaid wages, social security benefits or overtime compensation, or for complaints filed against exploitative 48 49 50 51 52 “National preventive mechanisms” (see footnote 29). Ibid. See Jorrit Rijpma, “The Proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard: evolution or revolution in external border management?”, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2016. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, arts. 3–4. Rijpma, “The Proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard” (see footnote 50). 17