A/HRC/19/60 34. Regardless of whether a list of recognized religions or beliefs is short or long, the human rights problem remains that, based on such an understanding, freedom of religion or belief could de facto or de jure unfold only within a set of permissible options that are more or less clearly predefined by the State. From the point of view of normative universalism, however, such limitations are problematic, as the right holders are “all members of the human family” whose most diverse self-understandings in the area of religion or belief constitute the starting point for the conceptualization and implementation of freedom of religion or belief as a universal human right. 35. A typical objection to a wide application of freedom of religion or belief points to harmful practices that may occur in the name of religions or beliefs, practices which may in fact require restrictions enacted by States to protect the rights of others or important public order interests. Such concerns are often associated with small communities sometimes negatively branded as “sects” or “cults”. They also frequently target members of nontraditional communities or groups perceived as not fitting into the cultural makeup of the country. 36. The Special Rapporteur would like to clarify two related points. First, even though harmful practices undoubtedly do occur in the name of religions or beliefs, it would be unacceptable to simply identify such problems with particular communities or types of communities, such as small groups or new religious movements. Allegations of harmful practices must always be based on clear empirical evidence and should not be presented as mere conjectures or negative projections, which often turn out to reflect existing stereotypes and prejudices. 37. Second, restrictions deemed necessary by States to protect the rights of others or important public interests against harmful religious manifestations must be enacted in strict conformity with the provisions laid down in article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Accordingly, restrictions can only be permissible if they are legally prescribed and if they are clearly needed to pursue a legitimate aim – the protection of public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In addition, restrictions must meet the requirements of proportionality; they must be limited to a minimum of interference and furthermore must be enacted in a strictly nondiscriminatory manner. All these criteria are important to preserving the substance of the human right to freedom of religion or belief, even in situations of a conflict with other human rights or important public order interests. 38. As a precondition for restricting certain external manifestations of freedom of religion or belief, States have to bear a burden of justifying any limitation, as required by article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, some States try to circumvent that burden of justification when imposing limitations on some religious or belief manifestations. For this purpose, sometimes restrictive definitions are used to exclude certain religious or belief communities from the very protection of their freedom of religion or belief. Such an approach often negatively affects members of minority religions, adherents to non-traditional religions or beliefs, or members of groups that are perceived as not fitting into the religious or cultural make-up of the country. Such use of restrictive definitions would clearly go against the universalistic spirit of human rights based on respect for everyone‟s human dignity. 39. Against such tendencies of resorting to restrictive definitions, the Special Rapporteur has always interpreted the scope of application of the freedom of religion or belief in a large sense, in line with the principle “in dubio pro libertate”, bearing in mind that manifestations of this freedom may be subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law 11