A/HRC/51/50 entered into formal juridical relations, via treaties or otherwise, with non-indigenous powers wish to claim for themselves juridical status also as nations, it must be presumed until proven otherwise that they continue to enjoy such status.64 34. Even when their rights are recognized, indigenous peoples are often addressed paternalistically,65 while their claims for self-determination and autonomy are viewed with suspicion. 66 A paradigm shift is essential to achieve genuine dialogue and cooperation between States and indigenous peoples, one based on recognition and partnership, which would require that States be more willing to share power. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recommended that New Zealand recognize the obligation to establish shared governance in compliance with the power-sharing arrangement established by Treaty of Waitangi.67 States should see power sharing as an opportunity for inclusiveness and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples in the heart of the government rather than a threat to its integrity. As stated by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples in 2019, “Treaties provide the foundation for the self-determination of indigenous peoples. Treaty enforcement should go together with the recognition of indigenous peoples as political entities with inherent powers of self-government”.68 B. Recognition of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements 35. The constitutional recognition and protection of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements is an important legal matter. For example, in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,69 Canada recognizes and affirms existing treaty and aboriginal rights, while in section 25 it provides further protections from abrogation or derogation that may result from other rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 70 The interpretation of section 35 continues in courts of law,71 and it is not clear whether other agreements, even if comprehensive, will receive the same constitutional protection and recognition as future treaties and land claims agreements that are specifically recognized in paragraph 3 of section 35.72 36. In Chile, a draft constitutional reform is under debate, and the expectation is that it will achieve constitutional recognition of the connection between the self-determination of indigenous peoples and their right to have their treaties respected by the State and their right to negotiate new ones.73 C. Imbalance of power 37. As stated by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, efforts by States to reduce power imbalances bring greater legitimacy to negotiations with indigenous peoples. 74 For example, States must ensure that indigenous peoples have the financial, 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, para. 288. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Derecho a la libre determinación de los Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales, para. 97. John B. Henriksen, “The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: some key issues and events in the process”, in Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, eds. (Copenhagen, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2009), p. 365. CERD/C/NZL/CO/21-22, paras. 12 and 13 (c). A/74/149, para. 42. See https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-13.html#docCont. See https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-12.html#h-50; see also submission by Canada. Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075; and Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313. Submission of the British Columbia Treaty Commission. Presentation of Francisco Cali Tzay’ at the Expert Seminar. A/66/288, para. 88. 9