A/HRC/51/50 concerned, compensation should take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 64. Articles 27, 28 and 40 underline two important points: (a) the right of indigenous peoples to have violations of their rights addressed and redressed through adequate processes; and (b) their right to participate in these processes, in compliance with the principle of free, prior and informed consent. 65. Entities in charge of addressing negotiations and solving disputes and conflicts should enjoy independence guaranteed by constitutional or other legislation and should have adequate funding and means to perform their work properly and efficiently. They must be empowered with explicit and broad mandates and their decisions should be binding and enforced. Such bodies should be set up in collaboration with indigenous peoples, with meaningful inclusion of indigenous approaches to dispute-resolution and indigenous laws. Their composition should guarantee pluralism and equal representation of indigenous peoples. Any power asymmetry between indigenous peoples and States within these bodies and in the enforcement of their decisions would undermine any sense of a “joint problemsolving” approach. Such bodies should operate with deep and comprehensive knowledge and understanding of international human rights law and the rights of indigenous peoples. A. Non-adversarial mechanisms 66. Conflict resolution mechanisms for addressing treaty-related issues between indigenous peoples and States should have a non-adversarial character. The Waitangi Tribunal is a permanent commission of inquiry set up to determine whether the actions, inactions or omissions of the Crown have breached the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.121 The rights enshrined in the Declaration have become increasingly relevant in interpreting these principles. 122 However, as observed by the Expert Mechanism, the interpretation of the Treaty by the Tribunal and the Courts is not made on its entirety and is not strictly in accordance with the te reo Maori text.123 67. The Waitangi Tribunal hearings, which are less formal and conducted in a manner that partially aligns with tikanga Maori dispute resolution approaches, produce recommendations, which are generally non-binding and frequently ignored by the Crown.124, The Tribunal is reportedly under-resourced and faces a significant number of complaints, and thus slow in enquiring, reporting and making recommendations on cases. 125 Many of these challenges have previously been considered by United Nations human rights treaty bodies 126 and by the Expert Mechanism, which advised the State to consider enhancing the role of the Tribunal to include: binding rather than recommendatory decisions; the power to assess policies against the Treaty; and the provision of additional human and financial resources. 127 68. In the State of Victoria, Australia, the legislation for defining treaty-making processes establishes a treaty authority, whose functions include providing for the resolution of disputes in treaty negotiations and establishing a dispute resolution process.128 The content of the treaty negotiation framework, which the Aboriginal Representative Body and the State would work on together, includes a mechanism for treaty enforcement.129 69. The British Columbia Treaty Commission, in Canada, an independent body, underpinned by legislation that ensures its longevity and continuity, was established in collaboration with indigenous peoples. Although it does not have an explicit mandate to 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 See https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/. Waitangi Tribunal, Whaia te Mana Motuhake: report on the Māori Community Development Act Claim (Lower Hutt, New Zealand, Legislation Direct, 2015). Expert Mechanism advice, New Zealand, para. 25. A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, para. 27. Expert Mechanism advice, New Zealand, para. 25. See E/C.12/NZL/CO/4 and CERD/C/NZL/CO/21-22. Expert Mechanism advice, New Zealand, para. 27. Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018, part 7. Ibid., part 5, sect. 31 (1) (e) and (f). 15