A/HRC/12/34/Add.3 page 16 55. Also highlighted to the Special Rapporteur was that indigenous women, in spite of some improvement, are still significantly under-represented in the Constituent Assembly. Another major barrier to advancing indigenous interests in the constitution-making process in practical terms, given political realities, is the two-thirds majority requirement of the Interim Constitution (art. 70) for the adoption of proposals into the constitutional text. 56. Once again, the Special Rapporteur commends Nepal for embarking on a constitution-making process that promises to move the country in an unprecedented transition to democracy, and for its initiatives to include indigenous peoples and their concerns in that process. He also notes with satisfaction in this regard the formation of the Committee on Protection of Rights of Minorities and Marginalized Communities, of which 17 of the 40 members are indigenous (2 from endangered and 3 from highly marginalized groups), as well as the establishment of the Committee on Cultural and Social Solidarity. 57. However, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that the indigenous representation and participation in the Constituent Assembly must be improved or supplemented by other means of indigenous participation in the constitution-making process. According to article 6 (1) of Convention 169, “governments shall … consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly”. The procedures in place for indigenous participation in the constitution-making process are not fully appropriate given the limitations identified above, nor are all indigenous peoples being allowed to participate through their own representative institutions. Further, the means provided for indigenous participation in the constitution-making process do not appear to be devised with the “objective of achieving agreement or consent” on the part of indigenous peoples to the constitutional provisions that directly affect their rights, as required by article 6 (2) of the Convention and, in even stronger terms, article 19 of the United Nations Declaration. 58. In order for Nepal to comply with the consultation provisions of Convention 169 and the Declaration as it develops a new constitution, indigenous peoples must be afforded greater means of participation in the process than is currently available to them. Unless the existing procedures and mechanisms of the Constitutional Assembly are significantly altered, separate consultations on the constitution should be carried out with the Adivasi Janajati through their own representative institutions, in appropriate forums that are supplemental to the Constituent Assembly. In spite of the aforementioned challenges, the Special Rapporteur encourages indigenous peoples and their representatives to actively engage and participate in the constitution-drafting process. By raising voices and concerns in that process, indigenous groups have an historic opportunity to secure their rights through peaceful means in the new constitution. C. Proposals for a federal State and indigenous self-determination 59. A central focus in the constitution-making process is the common demand, shared by indigenous peoples and other marginalized ethnic or social groups across Nepal, for the decentralization of political power and restructuring of the State into some sort of federal system that could accommodate the country’s diversity. The Interim Constitution identifies federalism