A/HRC/19/60/Add.2 given the presence of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and a number of other Orthodox denominations, it continues to claim a special status, de facto and de jure. For instance, legal proceedings continue concerning the legitimacy of administration by the Moldovan Orthodox Church of property claimed by the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (see paragraph 63 below). Also, according to information received by the Ministry of Defence, all chaplains currently offering their service within the military belong to the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The Moldovan Metropolitan also enjoys diplomatic status. 31. Besides such examples of a formally privileged position of the Orthodox Church, in particular its Moldovan Metropolitan branch, there seems to be a tendency in certain parts of society to simply equate national identity with the Orthodox tradition. Again, while the Special Rapporteur does not see a problem in appreciating the significance of Orthodox Christianity as a major factor of the history and culture of the country, the invocation of Orthodoxy in the interest of collective identity politics may have serious consequences for the non-discriminatory implementation of freedom of religion or belief for everyone. It can furthermore hinder the development of a public culture of respecting diversity. Indeed, as pointed out by civil society representatives, the existing and emerging diversity in the country has not yet been sufficiently embraced by society. For this reason, the Special Rapporteur looks forward to further clarification of this issue as envisaged in the new law adopted by Parliament on 21 December 2011.9 32. In discussions with civil society organizations, the Special Rapporteur heard allegations that, even for purposes of national statistics, individuals who do not explicitly identify themselves as followers of a different religious denomination or as atheists would de facto be counted as members of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. Moreover, the Church apparently wields enormous political influence. Members of Parliament expressed the view that politicians would require a great deal of courage to publicly resist political demands coming from the Orthodox Church, for instance concerning the current project of antidiscrimination legislation, which has encountered considerable opposition, much of it apparently based on misinformation about the purposes of the law. 33. When discussing with members of political movements who see themselves as supporters of Orthodoxy, the Special Rapporteur was concerned by statements that human rights and anti-discrimination provisions allegedly would be completely alien to Orthodox Christianity and thus amount to the imposition of “foreign norms”, with destructive consequences for the country’s national and religious identity. A high-ranking Orthodox priest from the Moldovan Orthodox Church even spoke of the Government’s willingness to adapt to international and European human rights norms as an act of “political prostitution”. The Special Rapporteur sincerely hopes that the vast majority of followers of the Orthodox Churches in Moldova do not subscribe to such positions, which would actually imply a devastating antagonism between the Orthodox tradition and international human rights, to the detriment of the prospects of both. Indeed, a number of interlocutors informed him that most members of the Orthodox churches in the country hold more moderate views. It seems, however, that such moderate Orthodox views are rarely expressed in the open, and that statements such as the one mentioned above in the name of the Orthodox Church go largely undisputed. 34. The predominant place and attitude of the Orthodox Church are also very present in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. For example, the Special Rapporteur heard plausible allegations that local authorities defer to the views of Orthodox clergy in banning Protestant religious gatherings in the region. 9 10 See footnote 5.