the Council's attention to the necessity in its eyes of treating it as a dispute. In the alternative the Government of South Africa maintained that even if the Court lhad competence it should nevertheless, as a matter of judicial propriety, refuse to give the opinion requested, on account of political pnessure to which, it was contended, the Court itlad been or might be subjected. On 8 February 1971, at the opening of the public sittings, the Resident of the Court declared that it would not be proper for the Court to entertain those od~servations,bearing as they did on the very nature of the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an organ which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of law, independently of all outside influences or interventions whatsoever. The Government of South Africa also advanced another reason for not giving the advisory opinion requested: that the question was in reality contc:ntious, because: it related to an existing dispute between South Africa and other States. The Court considers that it was asked to deal with a request put forward by a United Nations organ with a view to seeking legal advice on the consequences of its own decisions. The fact that, in order to give its answer, the Court might have to pronounce on legal question~supon which divergent views exist between South Africa and the United Nations does not convert the case into a dispute between States. (There was therefore no necessity to apply Article 83 'of the Rules of Court, according to which, if an advis13ry opinion is requested upon a legal question "actually pc:ndin~g between two or more States", Article 31 of the Statulk, dealing with judges ad hoc, is applicable; the Government of South Africa having requested leave to choose a judge ad' hoc, the Court heard its observations on that point on 27 January 1971 but. in the light of the above consiclerations, decided by the Order of 29 January 1971 not to accede to that request.) In sum, the Court saw no :reason to decline to answer the request for an advisory opinion. the obligations of mandatories. The International Court of Justice has consistently recognized that the Mandate survived the demise of the League, and South Africa also admitted as much for a number of years. Thus the supervisory element, which is an essential part of the Mandate. was bound to survive. The United Nations suggested a system of supervision which would not exceed tha~which applied under the mandates system, but this proposal was rejected by South Africa. Resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council (paras. 87-1 16 of the Advisory Opinion) History of the Mandate (paras. 42-86 of the Adviso~jOpinion) Refuting the contentions 0f'the South African Government and citing its own Pronounce~nentsin previous proceedings concerning South West Africa (Advisory Opinions of 1950, 1955 and 1956; Judgment of 1962), the Court recapitulates the history of the Mandate. The mandates system established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was based upon two principles of paramount importance: the principle of nonannexation and the principle that the vvell-being and development of the peoples concerned formed a sacred trust of civilisation. Taking the dt:velopments of' the past halfcentury into account, there can be little doulbt that the ultimate objective of the sacred tliust was self-determiinationand independence. The mandatov was to observe a number of obligations, and the Council of the League -was I:o see that they were fulfilled. The right!$of the mandatory a!3 such had their foundation in those obligations. When the League of Nations was dissoljred, the raison d'etre and original object of'these obligations .remained. Since their fulfilment did not depend on the existence of the League, they could not be brc,ught to an end 1nerel~because ~ ~ ~ bofe the supervisory organ had ceiised to exist. the League had not declared, or accepted even by im~lication, that the mandates would be cancelled or lapse with the dissolution of the League. The last resolution of the :[&ague AssemMy and Article 80, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter nlaintained Eventually, in 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby it decided that the: Mandate was terminated and that South Africa had no other right to administer the Temtory. Subsequently the Security Council adopted various resolutions including resolution 276 (1970) declaring the continued presence of South Afiica in Namibia illegal. Objections challenging the validity of these resolutions having been raised, the Court points out that it does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in relation to the United Nations organs in question. Nor does the validity of their resolutions form the subject of the request for advisory opinion. The Court nevertheless, in the exercise of its judicial function, and since these objections have been advanced, considers them in the course of its reasoning before determining the legal consequences arising from those resolutions. It first recalls that the entry into force of the United Nations Charter established a relationship between all Members of the United Nations on the one side, and each mandatory Power on the other, and that one of the fundamental principles governing that relationship is that the party which disowns or does not fulfil its obligations cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationshi~;~esohtion2145 (XXI) determined that there had been a inaterial breach of the Mandate, which South Africa had in fact disavowed. ~ths been (a) that the Covenalt of the bague of Nations did not confer on the Council of the League power to terminate a mandate for misconduct of the mandatory and that the United Nations could not derive from the League greater powers than the l a m itself had; (b) that, even if the Council of the League had possessed the power of revocation of the Mandate, it could not have been exercised unilaterally but only in co-operation with the Mandatory; (c) that resolution 2145 (XXI) made pronouncements which the General Assembly, not being a judicial organ, was not competent to make; (4that a detailed factual investigation was called for; (e) that one part of resolution 2145 (XXI) decided in effect a transfer of temtory. me~ : ~ uobserves rt (a) that, according to a general principle of internationallaw (incorporated in the vienna convention on the Law of Treaties), the right to terminate a treaty on account of breach must be presumed to exist in respect of all treaties, even if unexpressed; (b) that the consent of the wrongdoer to such a form of termination cannot be required; (c) that the United Nations, as a successor to the League, acting through its competent organ, must be seen above all as r the s supervisory institution competent to pronounce on the conduct of the Mandatory; (d) that the failure of South Africa to complly with the obligation to submitto supervisioncannot be disputed; (e) that the General Assembly was not making a finding on facts, but formulating a legal situation; it would not be correct to assume that, because it is in principle vested 79