A/HRC/27/52/Add.1 44. Following the signing of the San Lorenzo Agreement in February 2012, the Government, with the Catholic Church acting as mediator and the United Nations country team in Panama as an observer, set up two round tables with representatives of the Ngobe people to address controversial issues that remained unresolved, including the Mining Act and the Barro Blanco hydroelectric project. The round table on the Mining Act led to the drafting and adoption of Act No. 11 of 2012 (see para. 15 above). As a result of the round table on the Barro Blanco dam, the parties agreed to send a joint verification mission comprised of representatives of the Government of Panama, the United Nations and the Ngobe-Bugle comarca to the area to carry out a preliminary study on the impact of the project. 45. In its report of September 2012, the joint verification mission recommended that an independent study be carried out by an international team of experts. The hydraulic, ecological and economic aspects of the project were examined in July and August 2013 and a participatory, community-level assessment was prepared. The study concluded that the project’s impacts on the environment and the Ngobe communities in question could be mitigated but that appropriate consultations with the indigenous peoples in question had not been carried out and that the direct and indirect impacts had not been clearly explained or understood. It went on to say that the direct impacts could certainly affect the community as a whole and should be mitigated properly.33 46. Chan 75. In 2009, the Special Rapporteur visited the country to examine the situation of the indigenous communities affected by the Chan 75 hydroelectric project and issued a report containing recommendations in that regard (A/HRC/12/34/Add.5). For the most part, those recommendations were not heeded by the Government. The project resulted in the flooding of five Ngobe communities located outside the boundaries of the Ngobe comarca. Following the visit, most of the families concerned reached agreements with the Government and with AES Corporation, the terms of which have been made public. Two families have failed to reach an agreement with the enterprise, despite the fact that their farms have already been flooded. It is further claimed that AES has not completed construction work on the alternative housing that was promised to the families, who are currently living at various widely scattered locations. During the Special Rapporteur’s visit, government representatives told him that it had been a mistake on their part to allow the company to carry out the Chan 75 consultations on its own at the start of the project. Indigenous representatives also complained that the consultation process took the form of negotiations with individual families, rather than with indigenous representatives or traditional decision-making bodies. 47. Bonyic. The Bonyic project, which is located on traditional lands claimed by the Naso people, is another controversial hydroelectric project. Although the enterprise carrying out that project has reached agreements on compensation with a number of the families concerned, others informed the Special Rapporteur that they had not negotiated with the company. In 2004, the previous Naso king signed an agreement on compensation and benefits between the enterprise Hidro Ecológica del Teribe and the Naso people regarding the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric power station. In 2012, the current king signed an accord with the corporation which broadened the agreement on compensation and benefits, with the enterprise agreeing to provide a number of benefits mainly in the areas of job creation, education, health and infrastructure. However, a number of members of the Naso community oppose the accord and assert that they were not 33 12 Peritaje al Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Barro Blanco, Resultados del Diagnóstico Rural Participativo, September 2013, para. 100. GE.14-07234