CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 Appendix Individual opinion of Committee member, Ms. Patricia Schulz (dissenting) 1.1 I was not a member of the Committee at the time that it reached its decision on the admissibility of this complaint in 2010, but I have participated in the deliberations leading to the decision taken on 28 February 2012 and am therefore entitled to express my views concerning both the admissibility and the merits of the case. For the most part, I do not share the position adopted by the Committee in either of these two respects. 1.2 In my view, the communication should have been found to be inadmissible under article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, and possibly also under article 4, paragraph 2, on the ground that it is manifestly ill-founded. Having nonetheless been found admissible, the communication should have been rejected on its merits because no evidence was provided of the alleged discrimination against the author or against women in Canada, including aboriginal women, rural women, women living in the Rae-Edzo community and women who are victims of domestic violence. I would also point out that the author is not qualified to submit a communication on behalf of those groups of women, under the terms of article 2 of the Optional Protocol. Admissibility 2.1 I share the Committee’s view that the communication is admissible ratione temporis under article 4, paragraph 2 (e), of the Optional Protocol. However, I believe, as does the State party, that the author has not exhausted the available domestic remedies, which, under article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol, renders her communication inadmissible. The author did not make use of all the available legal procedures during the three court actions brought before the judicial authorities, inasmuch as she did not make the court review the merits of either her claims or her allegations that she was the victim of one or more acts of discrimination committed by the respondents in those legal actions, which included the two State housing authorities involved in the case, and by the legal aid service and her court-appointed defence attorneys. It was not until she submitted her communication to the Committee that the author alleged — in my view, for the first time — that she had been the victim of sexism and racism on the part of the authorities, the legal aid service and her court-appointed defence attorneys. The Canadian courts were thus unable to consider the merits of her allegations concerning one or more forms of discrimination against her or, if appropriate, provide her with compensation on that basis. 2.2 The author filed the first civil suit in May 1995. The sole respondent was her former partner. She claimed to have been the victim of violence, trespass to chattels and eviction from the house which they had bought together. She sought compensation for various damages (see para. 2.7 of the communication) and a statement indicating that her former partner had been aided and abetted in obtaining the dwelling by the Government of the Northwest Territories. W.S. (the partner) died in November 1995, five months after the suit had been filed. Following his death, the author took no further action to continue with the suit, which remained pending until 2003. 2.3 A second civil suit was filed by the author in March 1996, in which she named the estate of her former partner, a friend of his who was living in the house, and the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. The author claimed that the Corporation had allowed W.S. to appropriate her share of the property by fraudulent means. It was only then that, for the first time, the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation was informed of the author’s 19