- 24 42. More specifically, the Respondent maintains that no material evidence has been
presented by Ukraine demonstrating that the Russian Federation provided weaponry to any entity
“with the requisite specific intent or knowledge” under Article 2, paragraph 1, of the ICSFT that
such weaponry would be used to shoot down flight MH17. With regard to four specific incidents of
alleged indiscriminate shelling, the Russian Federation submits that no new evidence has been
presented by Ukraine since the stage of provisional measures. In the Respondent’s view, Ukraine
fails to present any credible evidence that the perpetrators of the shelling acted with “the requisite
specific intent to kill or seriously harm civilians” and that the locations were shelled “for the
requisite specific purpose of intimidating the population or to compel a government to do or to
abstain from doing any act”. Moreover, even if a plausible case of terrorism could be demonstrated
with regard to those incidents, the Russian Federation argues that Ukraine would also be implicated
in the commission of indiscriminate shelling during the same conflict. Concerning the further
allegation of bombing that took place in Kharkiv, the Respondent maintains that no reliable
evidence was submitted to show that the incident was perpetrated with the Russian Federation’s
support. The Russian Federation also maintains that, in diplomatic correspondence, it confirmed its
interest in receiving from Ukraine “the concrete materials containing evidential data” relating to
that incident, which Ukraine failed to provide. Furthermore, with regard to other alleged acts of
extrajudicial killing, torture and ill-treatment of civilians, the Respondent contends that the
evidence does not demonstrate that they were “plausible ‘terrorist’ acts within the meaning of
Article 2 (1) (b) of the ICSFT”. According to the Russian Federation, such acts have in any case
been committed by all parties to the armed conflict.
43. The Russian Federation is of the view that the ICSFT is a “law enforcement instrument”
which does not cover issues of State responsibility for financing acts of terrorism. It bases its
interpretation on a textual analysis of the Convention, as well as on considerations pertaining to the
structure of the ICSFT, the preparatory work related to the drafting of specific articles, provisions
of other conventions concerned with terrorism and subsequent State practice. The
Russian Federation asserts that multiple attempts were made by delegations during the drafting of
the ICSFT to bring public officials and State financing within the scope of the Convention, but all
attempts failed.
44. The Russian Federation maintains that the Court must at this stage fully interpret the
relevant provisions of the ICSFT, especially Article 2, paragraph 1. The Russian Federation
submits that the term “any person” in Article 2, paragraph 1, has to be interpreted as meaning
“private persons only” and does not cover State officials. It points out that Ukraine is asking the
Court to find that the Russian Federation has not prevented its own officials from financing
terrorism. In the Respondent’s view, while State responsibility is excluded from the scope of the
ICSFT, a finding that State officials are also covered would mean declaring that the
Russian Federation is directly responsible for financing terrorism in accordance with Article 4 of
the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the
International Law Commission.