all differences in treatment discriminatory; a differentiation based on
reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination
within the meaning of that article.
6S1. In case No. 395/1990 (M. Th. Sprenger v. the Netherlands), the Committee
found that the distinction in the enjoyment of benefits under the Health
Insurance Act between married and unmarried couples was reasonable in the
light of the objective differences between the two categories still existing
in the Netherlands legal system, it noted the explanation of the State party
that there had been no general abolition of the distinction between married
persons and cohabitants, and the reasons given for the continuation of that
distinction. The Committee found the differential treatment to be based on
reasonable and objective grounds. In a concurring individual opinion, three
Committee members stated that article 26 should not be interpreted as
requiring absolute equality or non-discrimination in the field of social
security legislation at all times, but should be seen as a general undertaking
on the part of States parties to review regularly their legislation in order
to ensure that it corresponded to the changing needs of society (annex IX,
sect. P ) .
682. In case No. 415/1990 (Dietmar Pauger v. Austria), the Committee found
that the distinction merely on the basis of sex under the Pension Act between
widows and widowers, whose social circumstances were similar, amounted to
discrimination in violation of the relevant article of the Covenant. It
recommended that Austria should offer Mr. Pauger an appropriate remedy
(annex IX, sect. R ) .
nittee's views
683. The Committee's decisions on the merits are referred to as "views" in
article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol. After the Committee has
made a finding of a violation of a provision of the Covenant, it proceeds to
ask the State party to take appropriate steps to remedy the violation. For
instance, in the period covered by the present report, the Committee, in a
case concerning the death penalty, found:
"In capital punishment cases, the obligation of States parties to observe
rigorously all the guarantees for a fair trial set out in article 14 of
the Covenant admits of no exception. The Committee is of the view that
Mr. Raphael Henry* a victim of a violation of article 14, paragraph 5,
and consequently of article 6, is entitled, according to article 2,
paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, to an effective remedy, in this case
entailing his release; the State party is under an obligation to take
measures to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future."
The Committee further stated that it wished to receive information, within 90
days, on any relevant measures taken by the State party in respect of the
Committee's views (case No. 230/1987 (Raphael Henry v. Jamaica), annex IX,
sect. B, paras. 10 and 11).
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