religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria. Hence, the prohibition of adverse distinction includes that members of national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities are not to be discriminated against. Yet, it is also broader as it includes other grounds, such as political opinion. In other words, the prohibition of adverse distinction protects minorities, but it is not specifically designed or tailored towards the protection of minorities. Although the prohibition of adverse distinction is a guiding principle underlying IHL, it remains remarkably underexplored in scholarship and state practice. In relation to the protection of minorities, two issues would deserve further analysis. First, the prohibition of adverse distinction is geared towards the treatment of individuals. It is not clear whether and how the direct and indirect impact of an armed conflict on minority groups and their identity could be covered. Second, the prohibition of adverse distinction is generally understood as being limited to the treatment of persons who are in the hands of a party to a conflict, including those who are detained, who are in internment camps, or who are in occupied territory. It applies to protection obligations, such as the provision of medical aid or the guarantee of humane treatment. It is an open question whether the prohibition of adverse distinction may have a broader, “umbrella” function in requiring non-discrimination in the application of all the rules in IHL, including those governing the conduct of hostilities. In this context, it could also play a further role for the protection of minority groups. 3) The prohibition of adverse distinction underlying humanitarian relief The third aspect that deserves to be mentioned is that the principle prohibiting adverse distinction also applies to humanitarian relief. IHL regulates the question of access for humanitarian relief. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the relevant rules, it is generally understood that the parties to an armed conflict must allow humanitarian relief for civilians in need which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction. This brings me to my concluding remarks on the accountability of humanitarian actors during humanitarian crises. IHL does not address the accountability of humanitarian actors as such. Yet, as just explained, no adverse distinction in the delivery of humanitarian relief is permitted. If a State or armed group told a provider of humanitarian relief that it could provide assistance to only some national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups and not others, amounting to adverse distinction against minorities, humanitarian actors would arguably be outside the framework provided by IHL and have an obligation to reject such operations as incompatible with principled impartial humanitarian action. Finally, one could also argue that in order to ensure that humanitarian relief does not have an indirect adverse distinction based on prohibited grounds, including in relation to minorities, humanitarian actors should take into account the specific needs and challenges faced by minorities in accessing humanitarian relief during armed conflict.