E/C.12/75/D/226/2021 E/C.12/75/D/227/2021 rights.10 The right to housing should be ensured to all persons irrespective of income or access to economic resources,11 and States parties should take whatever steps are necessary for that purpose, to the maximum of their available resources. 12 8.2 Forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with the Covenant and can be justified only in the most exceptional circumstances.13 The relevant authorities must ensure that they are carried out in accordance with legislation that is compatible with the Covenant and in accordance with the general principles of reasonableness and of the proportionality of the legitimate objective of the eviction to its consequences for the evicted persons. 14 That obligation flows from the interpretation of the State party’s obligations under article 2 (1) of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 11, and in accordance with the requirements of article 4, which stipulates the conditions under which such limitations on the enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant are permitted.15 8.3 For an eviction to be justifiable, it must thus meet a number of requirements as provided for in article 4. First, the limitation of the right to adequate housing must be determined by law. Second, it must promote general welfare in a democratic society. Third, it must be suited to the legitimate purpose cited. Fourth, the limitation must be necessary, in the sense that, if various means of achieving the goal pursued could reasonably be expected to succeed, the one that interferes least with the right must be used. Lastly, the benefits of the limitation in promoting general welfare must outweigh the impact on the enjoyment of the right being limited. The more serious the impact on the right enshrined in the Covenant, the greater the scrutiny that must be given to the grounds invoked for such a limitation. 16 The availability of adequate alternative housing, the personal circumstances of the occupants and their dependants and their cooperation with the authorities in seeking suitable solutions are crucial factors in such an analysis. Moreover, a distinction inevitably needs to be made between evictions from properties belonging to individuals who need them as a home or to provide vital income and properties belonging to financial institutions or other entities. 17 The State party will therefore be committing a violation of the right to adequate housing if it stipulates that a person who is occupying a property without legal title must be evicted immediately, irrespective of the circumstances in which the eviction order is to be carried out.18 The assessment of the proportionality of the measure must be carried out by a judicial or other impartial and independent authority with the power to order the cessation of the violation and to provide an effective remedy. The authority must ascertain whether the eviction is compatible with the Covenant, including with regard to the elements of the proportionality test required by article 4 of the Covenant, as described above.19 However, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality might make it necessary to stay or postpone the eviction order so as to avoid subjecting the evicted persons to destitution or violations of other rights enshrined in the Covenant. An eviction order may also depend on other factors, such as an obligation for the administrative authorities to step in to help the occupants with a view to mitigating the consequences of the eviction.20 8.4 In addition, there must not be alternative measures or measures that involve less interference with the right to housing, and the persons concerned must not remain in or be exposed to a situation constituting a violation of other Covenant or human rights. 21 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 GE.24-03814 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 4 (1991), para. 1. Ibid., para. 7. Ibid., para. 12. Ibid., para. 18; and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 7 (1997), para. 1. For example, Ben Djazia et al. v. Spain (E/C.12/61/D/5/2015), para. 13.4; and Vázquez Guerreiro et al. v. Spain (E/C.12/74/D/70/2018), para. 8.2. For example, Gómez-Limón Pardo v. Spain (E/C.12/67/D/52/2018), para. 9.4; and Vázquez Guerreiro et al. v. Spain, para. 8.2. Vázquez Guerreiro et al. v. Spain, para. 8.3. López Albán et al. v. Spain (E/C.12/66/D/37/2018), para. 11.5. Ibid., para. 11.7. Ibid., para. 11.6. Ibid., para. 11.5. Ben Djazia et al. v. Spain, para. 15.1. 9